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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XIV APRIL, 1940 NUMBER 2
DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION UNDER THE
NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
W iTH the adoption of the New York Civil Practice Act in
1921, practicing attorneys were presented with several
weapons of great promise. Sections 322 to 328 inclusive,
under Article 32 relating to "Admissions, Discovery and In-
spection", may well prove the strength or weakness of a case
when correctly used," and are, therefore, sturdy probes in
expediting trials or settlements. The discussion in this arti-
cle will be confined to Section 327 entitled "Discovery or
Inspection on Notice." This section is practically verbatim
Order xxxi, Rule 15 of the English Rules of the Supreme
Court,2 and is set forth in full:
1 The legal pitfalls into which the unwary may blunder are illustrated in
Mertens v. Raffers, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 5, 1938, which was an action wherein
plaintiff's intestate was struck by a car owned and driven by a claimed employee
of plaintiff then allegedly using his car in the corporation's business. Plaintiff
served a notice of examination before trial and on the return date served a
subpoena duces tecum. Defendant corporation moved to vacate the subpoena
and plaintiff moved for production under § 296, N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. AcT. It was
held that the service of the subpoena was not timely (N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT
§ 411) and the examination having already been had, plaintiff's motion "is denied
without prejudice to her rights to move for a discovery and inspection pursuant
to section 324 of the Civil Practice Act." The importance of obtaining defen-
dant's records is apparent and, since production by subpoena could result only in
utilization thereof to refresh the witness' recollection, New York City Car Advt.
Co. v. E. Regensburg & Sons, 205 App. Div. 705, 200 N. Y. Supp. 145 (lst Dept.
1923), and § 324 is available "only in the exercise of a sound discretion".
Union Trust Co. v. Francis, 154 Misc. 83, 277 N. Y. Supp. 332 (1934), quoting
Murphy v. Keenan, 101 Misc. 443, 446, 167 N. Y. Supp. 55, 56 (1917), aff'd, 183
App. Div. 923, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1099 (4th Dept. 1918), and citing Bencoe v. Mc-
Donnell, 210 App. Div. 123, 205 N. Y. Supp. 343 (2d Dept. 1924) when the docu-
ments are "evidence themselves", People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245
N. Y. 24, 29, 156 N. E. 84 (1927), it is submitted that plaintiff's varied moves
disclose a regrettable lack of knowledge of art. 32.
2 See RuLES oF T E SuPREmE CouRT (1883-1932) Lord Chancellor's De-
partment, Rule 31, § 15. The English rule speaks of "a cause or matter"
instead of "an action", the "court or judge", instead of merely our "court", but
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"Every party to an action shall be entitled, at
any time, by notice in writing, to give notice to any
other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference
is made to any document, to produce such document
for the inspection of the party giving such notice, or
of his attorney, and to permit him or them to take
copies thereof; and any party not complying with
such notice shall not afterward be at liberty to put
any such document in evidence on his behalf in such
cause or matter, unless he shall satisfy the court that
such document relates only to his own title, he being
a defendant, or that he had some other cause or ex-
cuse which the court shall deem sufficient for not
complying with such notice, in which case the court
may allow the same to be put in evidence on such
terms as to costs and otherwise as the court shall
think fit."
I.
The history of documentary production and discovery,
as distinct from a mere notice to produce, is traceable to the
is otherwise identical (save for three minor details). The Australian counter-
part, with but minor variations in language, is found in 2 LAWS OF COMMON-
WEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (1901-1931) 1192, under HIGH CouRT RuLEs, Part 1,
Order 29, § 12. Order 29 is entitled "Discovery and Inspection", contains 24
sections, and is minutely patterned after the ENGLISH SUPREME COURT RULES.
See, however, THE JUDICATURE ACT AND RULES OF COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD
ISLAND (1929) Order 31 entitled "Discovery of Documents", which has three
sections embracing respectively the power of the court to order production, the
penalty for disobedience, and the manner of service of the order. The first
section, with insignificant changes, is verbatim Rule 27 of the original 1873
JUDICATURE AT OF ENGLAND (never in force and merely pending until the
radical 1875 amendments were adopted. See notes 13, 17, 21, infra). The
QUEBEC CODE OF CIV. PROC. (1939), Third Part, c. 17, § 11 is entitled "Discovery
and Inspection of Documents" and art. 289 follows: "Upon the application
of any party, the judge may, at any time after defence filed and before trial,
order the opposite party to exhibit any object, or to give communication or
furnish a copy or allow a copy to be made of, any book or document in his
control, relating to the action or the defense, at such times and places, and under
such conditions and in such manner as are deemed proper." As will be later
seen, this article is not, if a grant of power, sufficient to authorize the court to
do more than it would ordinarily possess. Patently serious defects should be
remedied and it is suggested that the larger commonwealth states adopt ver-
batim the English rules in these respects. RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL
(1932) lists various Empire enactments under the general rules in Order 31
(see p. 180, n.2, p. 267 et seq., he appends the federal and state statutes, setting
forth verbatim the enactments with respect to examinations and discovery). 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1859, p. 979, which also contains references
to the Canadian enactments.
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days when civil and ecclesiastical courts competed with each
other. The greater flexibility of the latter in this special
respect,3 as well as its enormous superiority in others, even-
tually forced the king's conscience to respond through Chan-
cery Courts, 4 whose new system of pleading was borrowed
from the ecclesiastical and common law courts.5 In these
early years the cumbersome and involved legal system sep-
arated discovery from pleading. The filing of pleadings was
a right, having in it no element of duty, whereas the reverse
was true with respect to discovery. The Chancery Court,
however, united the bill for discovery with the pleading it-
self so that suit was instituted wherein discovery might be
obtained, either as an incident to the relief actually sought
3 Langdell, Discovery Under thw Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875, Part I (1897)
11 HARV. L. REv. 137, 145. See 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.
1918) § 14; 3 WIGMroo, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 1857 et seq.
4 For an extended discussion of the origin and history of the Chancery
Court see 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) 42 to 63. Professor
Story enumerates several views and then sets forth his conclusions at page 53
that "If this [the publication by the English Commissioners on the Public
Records of Chancery proceedings] be a true account of the earliest known exer-
cises of equitable jurisdiction, it establishes the point that it was principally
applied to remedy defects in the common-law proceedings * * *." See PomE-
ROY, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1, and HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITRATURE
OF ENGLISH LAW (1925) 177 et seq.
5 Langdell, op. cit. supra note 3, at 205, 207. See the excellent statement in
11 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 39: "In former days it was often necessary
to resort to the Court of Chancery and commence a suit by bill there for the
purpose alone of getting discovery. But from the time of the passing of the
Common Law Procedure Acts and the Judicature Acts this practically ceased
to be necessary. Instances of such actions are now rarely met with, since any
discovery formerly obtainable only by bill in Chancery can now be obtained in
an action in any division of the High Court" (citing Ramsden v. Brearley,
[1875], 33 L. T. 322, 323). This section and citation is restated verbatim in the
HAILSHAM EDITION, 1933, Vol. 10, p. 341. The statement concerning the
Common Law Procedure and Judicature Acts is, however, not entirely correct.
Note 9, infra, contains a portion of 14 & 15 VicT., enacted in 1851, whereas
the Common Law Procedure Act involved was enacted 1854 (and the Judicature
Acts much later). Such act, in so far as is applicable, is found in 17 & 18
VicT. §§ 50, 51 (1854). The sections permit a court order upon affidavits,
directing the opposing party to file an affidavit of documents together with
objections to their production, and also give the court power through "Interroga-
tories in Writing upon any matter as to which Discovery may be sought" to
compel the said party likewise to answer these interrogatories under oath.
(Section 52 sets forth the procedure for such order and Section 53 permits
oral examination where the answers to the written interrogatories are insuffi-
cient.) RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13, states that "The first chancellors
were churchmen and accordingly procedure in courts of chancery was modelled
in many respects after procedure in the ecclesiastical courts. The canon law
practice is especially significant in respect to the development of discovery
procedure in equity."
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or as the ultimate object involved,6 production thereafter
occurring as a further and additional step in these -varied
moves.7  Through the statuteg of 15 and 16 Victoria it was
attempted to alleviate these hardships, 8 but "it is impossible
to say much for the labors of the commission, so far as they
6 (1898) 12 HARv. L. REv. 151, 152f. Since the plaintiff could not be
directed to give discovery to the defendant, it became necessary for the latter
to file a separate bill, making the original plaintiff a defendant, so that the
plaintiff-now-defendant could thus be forced to obey the court's orders in this
respect See (1897) 11 HARV. L. REv. 216. See note 10, infra; RADCLIFFE
AND CRoss, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (1937) 133, 134 (" * * * the procedure
and organization of the Court of Chancery was well adapted for * * * that
branch of the auxiliary jurisdiction known as 'discovery', under which a litigant
in an action at common law could compel the discovery by his opponent of
documents which the latter could not have been compelled to produce under the
rules of evidence in the common law courts. * * * a party in a common law
action was allowed to avail himself of the jurisdiction which the Chancery had
to compel persons to make disclosures on oath, in order to secure a sworn state-
ment from his opponent of the documents in his possession * * *. The Chancery
had, of course, a discretion in the matter. The person against whom discovery
was sought could claim that a given document was, on one ground or another,
privileged from inspection by his opponent or that it would be unfair to him to
compel him to answer any given interrogatory"). See Evans v. Richardson,.
[1818] 1 Swans. 7, 36 Eng. Rep. 275, where the theory was put as follows:
"When the Court orders letters and papers to be produced, it proceeds on the
principle, that those documents are, by reference, incorporated in the answer and
become a part of it. Being in the office, the effect is the same as if they were
stated in haec verba in the answer."
7 The "discovery" of documents is distinct from their "production". The
best analogy is to refer to N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 328 whereby an affidavit of
documents is required and thereafter production is obtained of the documents
referred to pursuant to N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 324. Schmoll Fils Associated,
Inc. v. Baltic America Line, Inc., 231 App. Div. 231, 247 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1st
Depi. 1931) (wherein the distinction and procedure is discussed). See 28
ENG. & EMp. DIG. (1924) § 2(53), p. 47, stating the general rule to be that "The
practice of the courts is against the proposition that the question of production
& the question of discovery are the same", citing Quin v. Ratcliff; [1860] 3 L. T.
363 ("The rule as to discovery is the exact contrary to that as to production.
You must set out every document you have in your possession, whether you are
bound to produce them or not); Swanston v. Lishman, [1881] 45 L. T. 360.
See Hegan v. Montgomery, [1896] 1 N. B. Eq. Rep. 247; Cushing Sulphite
Co. v. Cushing, [1903] 23 C. L. T. 231; Schetky v. Cochrane, [1918] 1 W. W.
R. 821; Moffett v. Moffett, [1886] 5 N. Z. L. R. 167.
8 15 & 16 VicT. . 86, §§ 10 to 20 (1852). Section 10 held that the "Bill of
Complaint shall not contain any Interrogatories for the Examination of the
Defendant." Section 18 permitted the Court, upon plaintiff's application, "to
make an Order for the Production by any Defendant, upon Oath, of such of the
Documents in his Possession or Power relating to (the) Matters in question in
the Suit, as the Court shall think right; and the Court may deal with such
Documents, when produced, in such Manner as shall appear just." Section 19
permitted a defendant to obtain a discovery, etc. "in any Suit, whether com-
menced by Bill or by Claim." Section 20 granted the Court power, on defen-
dant's application, "to make an Order for the Production by the Plaintiff in such
Suit, on Oath, of such * * * (verbatim as above in Section 18 except that here
the parenthesized "the" appears)."
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related to the system of pleading in the Court of Chancery." 9
These practicing impossibilities in obtaining discovery
under the old common law system, because of lack of power,
were thus overcome by the equitable invention of a separate
bill of discovery,10 which, nevertheless, proved cumbersome
and expensive.1 The remedies invoked were unsatisfactory
as a whole, 12 until finally, "a totally new system of pleading"
was inaugurated with the establishment of "a new Court of
Justice" in 1873.13 To this point the Act of 1851 '4 had
) (1899) 12 HARV. L. Rxv. 167. The previous year, 1851, there had
been enacted 14 & 15 Vicr. c. 99, § 6, which permitted discovery in the cases
themselves, without resort to equity by a separate bill, "in all cases in which
previous to the passing of this Act a Discovery might have been obtained by
filing a Bill or by any other Proceeding in a Court Equity * * *." See STAT-
UTES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND (1851) 658.1 0 Legard v. Foot, [1673] Rep. Tem. Finch, 82, 23 Eng. Rep. 44 (a bill of
discovery was disallowed); Cardale v. Watkins, [1820] 5 Madd. 18, 56 Eng.
Rep. 801 (a bill of discovery was disallowed, no purpose therefor being stated,
since equity "does not compel discovery for the mere gratification of curiosity,
but in aid of some other proceeding either pending or intended, and that there
must be allegations to that effect") ; Sanders v. King, [1821] 6 Madd. 61, 56
Eng. Rep. 1013 (a bill was upheld although the equitable powers of the court
were strained to the adoption of a new rule) ; Brent v. Young, [1838] 9 Sim.
180, 59 Eng. Rep. 327 (a bill was disallowed in aid of a defence to a suit in a
foreign court); Glasscott v. The Governor, [18401 11 Sim. 305, 59 Eng. Rep.892 (a bill was allowed) ; Attorney-General v. Corp. of London, [1850] 2 Mac.
& G. 247, 42 Eng. Rep. 95; Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, [1852] 15 Beav. 11,
51 Eng. Rep. 439 (the statute 15 & 16 VICT. was discussed). See note 6, supra.
11 Wilson v. Church, [1878] 9 Ch. Div. 552, Jessel, .R. there stated, at
p. 555: "The defect of the old common law 
system was, that it did not allow
you, in an ordinary action at law, to obtain discovery from your opponent, and
equity therefore invented the bill of discovery * * * as applied to actions at
law, (and) it gave a similar remedy where it was a suit in equity. * * * That
method was both cumbrous and expensive." See HALSBURY, 10C. Cit. supra
note 5; (1931) 44 HARv. L. R v. 633 ("At common law a party litigant had no
means of procuring information or documents from the adverse party before
trial. The chancellor, however, allowed a bill in equity to be brought asking as
the only relief, in addition to a temporary stay of the proceedings at law, that
the respondent be compelled to answer its allegations and interrogatories and
thereby disclose facts within his knowledge or belief; or to disclose and produce
documents, books, or other things within his possession or control. The pro-
ceeding was obviously wasteful of both time and expense").
12 Wilson v. Church, [1878] 9 Ch. Div. 552, 556 ("Then when the Legisla-
ture interfered [in the Com. Law Proc. Act of 1854] and interfered as usual in
a piecemeal way, it merely gave the right of discovery in a common law action
without interfering with the suit for discovery in equity * * *").
13 Ibid. The new court was the "one Supreme Court of Judicature in
England". 36 & 37 VIcT. c. 66, § 3 (1873), cited as the SUPREME COURT OF
JUDIcATuRE AcT, 1873 and became effective November 2, 1874 with certain
exceptions. These Acts altered the procedure and not the existing law, Lyell
v. Kennedy, [1882] 20 Ch. Div. 489; Hemmings v. Williamson, [1883] 10 Q. B.
D. 459, so that unless another provision therefor is made, the former procedure
and practice remains in force, Wilson v. Church, [1878] 9 Ch. D. 552, the
Chancery practice, however, taking precedence over the common law. JUDIcA-
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granted to common law courts the same powers of inspection
as the equity courts had previously wielded with respect to
discovery; 15 the Act of 1852 continued the power of produc-
tion in the Chancery Court theretofore existing; 16 and the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 re-codified the law and
enlarged upon the procedure. t The "new Court of Justice"
became invested with an extraordinarily enlarged 18 juris-
diction "for the better administration of justice" 19 and pro-
TuRE ACT (1873) § 25; Bustros v. White, [1876] 1 Q. B. D. 423, 426; Blockow
v. Fisher, [18821 10 Q. B. D. 161, 166; Anderson v. Bank, [1876] 2 Ch.
Div. 644.
14 14 & 15 Vicr. c. 99, § 6.
15 Ibid. The section authorized the common law courts to allow inspection
and "if necessary to take examined copies" in "all Cases in which previous to
the passing of this Act a Discovery might have been obtained by filing a Bill
*** in a Court of Equity * * *." For full text see note 9, supra.
16 15 & 16 Vicr. c. 86, §§ 20, 28. See note 8, supra. These sections deal
respectively with the plaintiff's and defendant's applications to the court for
discovery, etc.
17 17 & 18 Vicm. c. 125, § 50 et seq. See note 5, supra. The importance of
this enactment cannot be underestimated. Prior to 1854 equitable defences were
unknown in common law courts but this act incorporated, to some extent, equi-
able defences and relief. "Another extension of the powers of courts of equity
to the common law courts contained in the Act of 1854 was the power to compel
discovery of documents in the possession of a party to the action and to admin-
ister interrogatories. Hitherto discovery and interrogatories could only be
obtained in a common law action appealing to the auxiliary jurisdiction of the
Chancery and filing a bill there for the purpose. Now they could be obtained
far more cheaply and quickly in the action itself at common law." RADCLIFFE
& CROSS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 260f.
For a further statement upon this tendency toward assimilation see REPORT
OF THE COMMlSSION.RS (appointed to inquire into the expediency of bringing
together into one place or neighborhood all the Superior Courts of Law and
Equity (1860) 23: "* * * distinction between Courts of Equity and Courts of
Law, for which there is, in our judgment, no just or solid foundation. * * * the
tendency of legislation is to assimilate the Courts of Law and Equity, by an
attribution to each of powers and functions hitherto exercised exclusively by
one of them." See also 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (3d ed.
1939) 827; RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13, states that prior to the passage
of this second common law procedure act in 1854, the Commissioners on Courts
of Common Law in 1830 had circularized the bar of England with these ques-
tions: "Would it not be desirable, in order to obtain the benefit of a discovery
without having recourse to a court of equity, that the parties in a cause should
be examined under oath either personally, or by interrogatories? At what stage
of the proceedings should this be done, and before who, and What regulations
would you suggest for the purpose of carrying this measure into effect?" The
answers were in the negative (p. 12f).
18 36 & 37 Vicr. c. 66, § 16, enumerating eleven different courts.
19 Id. at 306, preface to Act. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, Op. cit. supra note
6, at 302: "it was one of the objects of the Common Law Procedure Acts and
the Chancery Amendment Acts to assimilate to one another the procedure of
the courts of law and equity. The Judicature Act completed this process by
establishing a single code of procedure for most proceedings in the new Supreme




vided for the enactment of "Rules or Orders of Court", not
inconsistent with the Act, and having the force of law.20
The Act supposedly took effect the following year (but was
postponed to November 2, 1875) and there was appended a
"Schedule" of rules for immediate enforcement, although it-
self subject to future Court alteration. 21  Notwithstanding
these provisions, the Act saved "all forms and methods of
procedure" not inconsistent with the Act and Rules, to those
"Courts whose jurisdiction is hereby transferred." 22
The schedule annexed to the Judicature Act of 1873
comprised fifty-eight rules, numbers twenty-five to twenty-
seven inclusive being grouped under "Discovery". The
amended re-enactment of 1875 24 increased this schedule and,
under Order xxxi entitled "Discovery and Inspection" set
forth twenty-three sections.25  The practice scheme incorpo-
rated in this new Order continued the existing procedure,
merely re-formulating in express language the generally ac-
cepted methods adopted over the years.20  The presently ef-
20 Id. § 23. The rule procedure is not of importance here and is therefore
not detailed.
21 Id. § 69, referring to the Schedule and making it a part of the Act.
22 Id. § 73. This Judicature Act was based upon the 1869 report of the 1867
commission and concentrated the various existing superior courts into a single
Supreme Court, permitted concurrent administration of legal and equitable
rules, and framed a uniform code of procedure. See RADCLiFE & CROSS, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 279. In 1925 the Act of 1873 was consolidated with sub-
sequent amendatory enactments into the SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (CON-
SOLIDATION) AcT, 1925 (15 & 16 GEO. V, c. 49) and by its Sixth Schedule the
numerous prior enactments there set forth were repealed. These statutory
enactments have not, however, done away with any common law discovery
rights previously existing. Brown v. Liell, [1885] 16 Q. B. D. 229, 230.
23 These three rules dealt with interrogatories and discovery thereon, Rule
25, the power of the court to order production, Rule 27, and the production of
documents on notice. This 1873 rule is practically the present rule set forth in
comparison with § 327 of the N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT. The slight differences
from § 327 are: Rule 26 spoke of "an action or other proceeding;" "at any
time before or at the hearing thereof;" "he being a defendant to the action, or
that he had some other sufficient cause (omit here present language) for not
complying with such notice (omit balance)."
24 38 & 39 Vicr. c. 77.
25Id. at 807f. The sections have since been increased to twenty-nine,
although some of these are repealed.
26 Cf. Lyell v. Kennedy, [1883] 8 App. Cases 217, 233, where Lord Fitz-
Gerald queried, "Whether under the Judicature Act and rules the right of dis-
covery is or is not more extensive than it formerly was in Courts of Equity.
* * * (if) the Judicature Act is an Act to regulate procedure, and not to affect
established rights, and if there was no right to discovery before the passing of
the Judicature Act, there is no right to interrogate now. * * * there can be no
doubt that the Judicature Act in carrying into effect the object stated in its
1940 ]
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fective rules have enlarged the sections to twenty-nine,2 7
preamble, 'the better administration of justice', does interfere with and alter
rights. * * *"
The importance of this new procedure is manifest in the following sum-
mary: within limits, prior to the "close of the pleadings", either party might,
and subsequent thereto by order could, deliver interrogatories for examination
of the opposite party (§ 1) ; if such interrogatories "have been exhibited unrea-
sonably, vexatiously, or at improper length" costs might be incurred (§ 2); a
form is here suggested- (§ 3) ; corporations, etc. can be interrogated through an
officer, etc. (§ 4) ; objections "may" be made upon application within four days
after service (§ 5) ; the interrogatories "shall be answered by affidavit" within
certain time limitations (§ 6) ; a form therefor is here suggested (§ 7, annulled
by revision of 1917) ; "Any objection to answering any interrogatory may be
taken, and the ground thereof stated in the affidavit" (§ 8) ; the sufficiency of
the affidavit "shall be determined * * * on motion or summons" (§ 9) ; omitted,
or insufficient, answers are overcome by an order directing either an answer or
a further one (§ 10, annulled by revision of 1917) ; "It shall be lawful * * * at
any time * * * to order the production by any party * * * of such of the docu-
ments in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question * * *"(§ 11) ; "Any party may, without filing any affidavit, apply to a Judge for an
order directing any other party to the action to make discovery on oath of the
documents which are or have been in his possession or power, relating to any
matter in question in the action" (§ 12) ; the affidavit for such discovery "shall(also) specify which * * * of the documents therein (the order in, § 12) men-
tioned, he objects to produce" (besides setting forth any others not objected to)(§ 13) ; § 14 is the production-on-notice section, set forth in text, and is, verbatim,
the 1873 rule compared in note 22, supra; a form for the notice is suggested(§ 15) ; the opposite party shall, within two days, "if all the documents therein
referred to (in the notice) have been set forth by him in such affidavit as is men-
tioned in Rule 13", or within four days if not so set forth, deliver a notice stating
when the documents not objected to might be inspected "and stating which (if
any) of the documents he objects to produce, and on what ground" (§ 16) ; if
the notice to produce is disregarded application may be made "for an order for
inspection" (§ 17) ; every application for an order to inspect "shall be to a
Judge" and unless the documents were "referred to in the pleadings or affi-
davits * * * or disclosed in his affidavit of documents, such application shall be
founded upon an affidavit showing of what documents inspection is sought," etc.(§ 18) ; where objection to discovery or inspection is made in whole or in part,
the Court or Judge may order that any issue or question involved in the case be
first determined where the objection is predicated upon claim that such discovery
or production is based upon the determination of such issue or question (§ 19) ;
if a party fails to answer interrogatories, or discover or produce documents,
punishment therefor is provided (§ 20) ; service of an order for discovery or
inspection on the solicitor is sufficient service on the party (§ 21) ; a solicitor
neglecting to give his client reasonable notice of any such order is liable to
attachment (§ 22) ; any party may use all or a part of the interrogatories as
evidence on the trial (§ 23).
27 RuLEs OF THE SUPREME CouaT, Order 31, twenty-nine sections, plus four
"A" sections, one of which has three subdivisions. Of these twenty-nine, Sec-
tions 7, 10, and 25 have been annulled by the revision of 1917. The first eleven
sections apply to interrogatories and change slightly the procedure set forth in
the Act of 1875; Section 12 repeats the original section with an additional grant
of power to the court to either "refuse or adjourn" the application; Section 13
repeats the original section; Section 13A is a new. section. Prior thereto the
court could only order an affidavit of documents when a discovery application
was made. Now the court may order "a list of the documents" in lieu of the
affidavit, but without precluding a future order for such affidavit; Section 14 is
a repetition of the original Section 11, giving the court power to order produc-
[ VOL.. 14
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but without impairing the structure created in 1875, and in
theory and practice are guided by the original rules and de-
cisions. 28 Underlying these enactments has been the legal
belief that all documents relevant to any issue should be dis-
closed and thereafter produced. Where the moving party has
knowledge of the documents, production can be ordered with-
out discovery; where the other party makes them known in
a manner suggesting relevance, then likewise should they be
produced; in other words, documentary openness is encour-
aged. The method utilized is, under the rules, a simple one.
Through interrogatories, documents may, perhaps, be dis-
closed,20 but the court is now empowered to direct "discovery
on oath of the documents which are or have been in" the
party's "possession or power, relating to any matter in ques-
tion therein." 30 Since discovery is wider in scope than pro-
duction,31 much may be learned about things that may there-
tion; Sections 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, -23, and 24 are the original Sections 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, respectively, with certain modifications,
notably changing the original Section 18 (note 25, supra) to: "Any application
to inspect documents, except as are referred to in the pleadings, particulars, or
affidavits * * *, or disclosed in his affidavit of documents", etc. (now § 18, subd.
2) ; the balance of the new sections are not of importance here but, if desired,
the latest additions and amendments are available in THE ANNUAL PRACTICE
(58th issue, 1940), familiarly known as the White Book.
28 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA, LAWS OF ENGLAND 826 et seq. See especially at 837:
"Rule 15 of R. S. C., Ord. 31, is founded on the old common law practice
relating to documents mentioned in pleadings * * *"29 EDWARD BRAY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTIcE, OF DISCOVERY (1885) 155:
"Discovery and production of documents was originally obtained in chancery by
means of interrogatories. They were either so framed as to compel the party
to set forth the short contents of the documents in his answer (and if necessary
the court would also order their production), or by means of a general charge
of possession of documents * * *." "By the Ch. P. Act, sections 18 and 20 ***
the affidavit of documents was introduced."
3o RULES SUPREME COURT, Order 31, Rule 12. See also Rule 19A (3),
which provides that notwithstanding any affidavit of documents has been ordered
or made, the court can, on application therefor, require an affidavit stating
"whether any particular document or documents or any class or classes of docu-
ments specified or indicated in the application, is or are, or has or have at any
time been, in his possession, custody, or power; and, if not then in his posses-
sion, custody, or power, when he parted with the same and what has become
thereof * * *." This "rule was framed to remove what was thought to be a
defect in the then existing law * * *" ; White v. Spafford & Co., [1901] 2 K. B.
241, 245, 70 L. J. K. B. 658. The previous rule, as set forth in Jones v. Monte
Video Gas Co., [1880] 5 Q. B. D. 556, 558, was that "It cannot be shewn by a
contentious affidavit that the affidavit of documents is insufficient. * * * the affi-
davit of documents must be accepted as conclusive," See Reddaway (F.) & Co.,
Ltd. v. Hartley, [1930] 48 P. P. C. 10; cf. Savage v. Canadian Pacific Ry.,
[1906] 3 W. L. R. 124, 15 Man. L. R. 401.
31 Jessel, M.R., in Swanston v. Lishman, [1881] 45 L. T. 360, 4 Asp. M. C.
450 ("The rule as to discovery is the exact contrary to that of production. You
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after be obtained. The sine qua non of the procedure appears
to be a degree of certainty of possession and relevance which
may serve as the foundation for production. It is in this
respect that Rule 15 comes into operation.
Rule 15 permits service of a notice to produce 32 where
reference is made to any document in one's "pleadings or
affidavits", and Rule 18(2) states that "Any application to
inspect documents, except such as are referred to in the
pleadings, particulars, or affidavits of the party against whom
the application is made, or disclosed in his affidavit of docu-
ments, shall be founded upon an affidavit * * *" 33 Regard-
less of prior utterances,3 4 the practice today appears defi-
must set out every document you have in your possession, whether you are bound
to produce them or not"). See Flight v. Robinson, [1844] 8 Beav. 22, 7
M. D. 606.
Rule 13 provides that the required affidavit of documents "shall specify
which, if any, of the documents therein mentioned he objects to produce * * *."
In 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, HAILSHAm 366, the procedure in the
affidavit of documents is set forth as follows: "The documents must be set
forth in two schedules. The first schedule must contain all the documents that
are in the possession or power of the deponent, and must be subdivided into two
parts, one part containing all the documents he is willing to produce, and the
other containing all the documents be objects to produce. The second schedule
must contain all the documents that have been but are not then in his possession
or power."
32 Rule 16 refers to "Form No. 9 in Appendix B., Part II" as the form to
be utilized "with such variations as circumstances may require." This form, the
title being the usual one, follows, verbatim: "Take notice that the (plaintiff or
defendant) requires you to produce for his inspection the following documents
referred to in your (statement of claim, or defence, or affidavit, dated
the day of 19 ). Describe documents required. Dated. etc."
Rule 17 sets forth the cross-notice requirements as to time and refers to "Form
No. 10 in Appendix B." This form likewise follows, verbatim: "Take notice
that you can inspect the documents mentioned in your notice of the day
of 19 (except the deed numbered in that notice) at my office
on Thursday next the instant between the hours of 12 and 4 o'clock." There
is likewise Form 10A, stating: "Take notice that the objects to give you
inspection of * * * (in whole or in part as desired, specifying which part) * * *
the documents mentioned in your notice of * * * (date) * * * on the ground
that * * * (set forth. If objection to part, continue) * * * but take notice that
you can inspect the remainder * * * (follow as in Form 10)."
33 In Rule 18(2) we note the inclusion of the term "particulars" between
the "pleadings or affidavits" of Rule 15.34 ENCYCLOPAEDIA LAWS OF ENGLAND 837 states: "Bray doubts whether it
(Rule 15) was ever intended to apply to an affidavit of documents; but the
practice of so using the rule is inveterate and it is in daily use for the purpose
mentioned." Bray feels that despite the new Rules "it does not seem possible to
dispense with a consideration of the old practice in equity and at common law
* * *" (p. 240). Under the catch-line "As to whether 'affidavits' includes the
affidavit of documents or any affidavit of discovery" (p. 242) Bray writes: "In
the common law division 'affidavits' has been interpreted to include the affidavit
of documents, the machinery of this and the following rules being used to obtain
inspection of documents disclosed in the affidavit of documents, the order for the
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nitely to be that reference to any document in the above man-
affidavit not directing production as in the Chancery Division* * *. Had it not been
for this practice it might have been doubtful whether it was the intention to
include it. In the first place in Rule 18 the phrase 'documents referred to in the
pleadings or affidavit... or disclosed in his affidavit of documents' is used, thus
distinguishing between the two cases. In the second place, if 'affidavits' is to
include the affidavit of documents, by the latter part of Rule 15 the plaintiff is
prima facie at least put under an obligation to produce all his documentary evi-
dence, that is to say, in default of doing so he becomes subject to the penalty of
being unable to use them in evidence. (Citations). The judgments of the C. A.
(Court of Appeal) * * * certainly seem to treat these rules as not applying to
documents which are only scheduled in the affidavit of documents. Nor is Rule
17 necessarily inconsistent with this view: the case there contemplated might be
the case where the document is set forth in the affidavit of documents as well as
referred to in a pleading or affidavit. Q u. (sic) whether on principle such a
penalty should attach to any documents referred to in an affidavit in answer to
interrogatories, and whether it should not be confined to voluntary affidavits,
and not extend to compulsory affidavits of discovery."
Dissent is expressed by this writer with the above views. Bray's criticisms
are three-fold: (1) that under Rule 18 two cases are distinguished; (2) under
Rule 15 a plaintiff becomes subject to a penalty; and (3) Rule 17 is not incon-
sistent with his views. Bray then queries whether, on principle, such penalty
should attach. (1) Although the 1885 rule is a trifle different from today's, yet
the thought is similar. Thus in Rule 18 is found the procedural requirement
that the court can order inspection (a) when reference is made in the "plead-
ings, particulars, or affidavits," "or disclosed in his affidavit of documents," and
(b) when the party shows what documents he seeks, that he is "entitled to
inspect them," and they are "in the possession or power of the other party."
The three requirements of (b) are already found in (a), the documents sought,
their relevancy, and their possession, so that an affidavit supporting an applica-
tion is not required. All of these matters have been previously determined and
it would be legal waste to repeat. Thus the affidavit of documents and plead-
ings, etc., are grouped into one classification for these purposes and, as opposed
to being "distinguished", are really conjoined. (It would thus appear that the
framers of Rule 18 intended either to amend Rule 15 directly or believed that
the later rule would be sufficient to include the affidavit of documents within the
earlier rule's scope. This is, of course, the writer's personal speculation.)
(2) The latter portion of Rule 15, as set forth in the body, provides that non-
compliance with the notice penalizes the party by his not being "at liberty to
put any such document in evidence," unless it relates to his (as a defendant) own
title or he had "some other cause or excuse". The best answer is to refer to the
leading case of Quilter v. Heatly, [1883] 23 Ch. Div. 42. There Jessel, M.R.,
referred to the case of Webster v. Whewall, [1879] 15 Ch. Div. 120, and held
that the decision was correct but the reasoning faulty. He adverted only to
that portion of the Webster decision as dealt with production by a plaintiff prior
to answer. He did not remark upon the other aspect which held that "Besides,
the Defendant had a remedy under the 17th rule (now Rule 18(1): "If the
party served with notice under Rule 15 * * * [fails to provide for inspection
the court may] on the application of the party desiring it, make an order for
inspection * * *."), if he considered the Plaintiff was wrong in his refusal, and
he ought not to have waited to the trial of the action to exclude * * *."
Lindley, L.J., in the Quitter case, at page 50, discussing the Webster case, said
that "The defendant (there) had never applied to a Judge for an order for
production, and the case in substance turned on this, that it was quite plain that
the defendant really did not require to see the document before the trial." So
that parties really desiring production can obtain it regardless of non-production
in violation of a notice, and the last portion of Rule 15 is thus not inflexible and
automatic. Cf. HALSBIRY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 377: "The party to whom
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ner is sufficient to permit notice to issue.35 Although the
rule states that the party 36 is "entitled" to give such notice,
still'the word is so qualified and restricted that it is at all
times (practically) subject to the court's discretion.3 7 The
the notice is given must produce the documents specified in it, unless he can
show good cause why he should not do so, the onus being on him to justify the
refusal." This seemingly is qualified in 4 ENCYLO P DIA LAWS OF ENGLAND
838: "It is on an application under this rule [18(1)] that the validity of
any claim of privilege from inspection is generally tested." (Italics ours.)
(3) Rule 17 then and now provided that the party receiving the notice was to
deliver his own notice stating a time within three days thereafter when and
where inspection might occur. Two situations are provided for: if the docu-
ments are set forth in a previous affidavit of documents, then such cross-notice
must be given within two days after receipt of the notice to produce; if not so
set forth, but contained in "pleadings or affidavits," then service of the cross-
notice is required within four days. A very definite reason is assignable for
this time-distinction. Where an affidavit of documents is given the documents
are presumptively under "possession or power" and undoubtedly have been
referred to so as to be set forth in the affidavit of documents with particularity;
where they have been referred to in "pleadings or affidavits" they may have been
so referred to from memory, copies, notes, etc., and may require a little more
time to be produced for inspection. Thus two distinct situations are envisioned
so that Bray's contemplated "set forth in the affidavit of documents as well as
referred to in a pleading or affidavit" is incorrect. Lastly, Bray's query con-
cerning the "voluntary" and "compulsory" affidavits is a matter of principle, as
he suggests, and therefore not within the scope of this portion of the article.
35 HALSBURY, Op. Cit. supra note 31; at 376f: "This is the mode of procur-
ing inspection most usually adopted. An order is usually first obtained for an
affidavit of documents and, on the affidavit being filed, notice is given to produce
the documents referred to in it or in any pleading or any other affidavit of the
party against whom inspection is sought." In Quilter v. Heatly, [1883] 23
Ch. Div. 42, 49f., Lindley, L.J., stated: "There is a broad distinction between a
general application for discovery of documents relating to the matters in ques-
tion in the action and an application for production of documents referred to in
the pleadings. * * * discovery was not to be given as a matter of course before a
defence was put in. But as to documents referred to in the pleadings the case
is different. * * *"
36 Eden v. Weardale Iron & Coal Co., [1887] 35 Ch. Div. 287, 295, per
Cotton, L.J.: "The words plaintiff and defendant in this section are so wide as
to include all persons who litigate one against the other, in any proceeding, any
question which the court may properly decide." See also the definition in
SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (CoNsOLIDATED) Acr, 1925 (15 & 16 GEo. V,
c. 49) § 225, that "'Party' includes every person served with notice of or attend-
ing any proceeding, although not named on the record." In Shaw v. Smith,
[1886] 18 Q. B. D. 193, approving Brown v. Watkins, [1885] 16 Q. B. D. 125 ,
the term as used in Rule 12 was held to mean any opposite party; cf. Spokes
v. Grosvenor, [1897] 2 Q. B. 124, but this does not necessarily mean an opposite
party in a record but even between plaintiffs or defendants where a right exists
to be adjusted. See Shaw v. Smith, supra; Birchall v. Birch, [1913] 2 Ch.
375; Molloy v. Kilby, .[1880] 15 Ch. Div. 162;-Alcoy, etc. Co. v. Greenhill,
[1896] 4 L. T. 345; Nelson & Sons v. Nelson Line, [1906] 2 K. B. 217. As to
interrogatories, see Eden v. Weardale, [1887] 35 Ch. Div. 287.
37Latter portion of Rule 15 as well as Rules 18(1), 18(2), 19A(1),
19A (2), and 20. The lengths to which this discretion went in the early cases
is shown in Lane v. Gray, [1873] 16 Eq. 552, 2 L. R. Dig. 2959, holding "that
the Defendant was not bound to make an affidavit of documents until a primafacie case had been made by the Plaintiff. The order for production of docu-
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liberality with which such discretion is exercised is best ex-
pressed in the holdings that the term "documents" is not con-
fined to evidentiary matters but includes also those "which,
it is reasonable to suppose, contains information which may
-not which must-either directly or indirectly enable the
party requiring the affidavit either to advance his own case
or to damage the case of his adversary." 38 Likewise is the
ments is discretionary." See Cory v. Cory, [1923] 1 Ch. 90, 95: "* * * the
discretion is one of the broadest kind (in granting discovery and that is) it
seems to me to be one reason, and a very cogent reason, for refusing to limit
the generality of the language." In Quilter v. Heatly, [1883] 23 Ch. Div. 42,
50, Lindley, L.J., states that "These rules (14 to 17) were evidently intended
to give the opposite party the same advantage as if the documents referred to
had been fully set out in the pleadings."
38 Compagnie Financiere v. Peruvian Guano Co., [1882] 11 Q. B. D. 55,
1 T. L. R. 188. The Court of Appeal was discussing Order 31, Rule 12 of the
Act of 1875 (similar to the present section with an additional power granted)
which permits discovery by the filing of an affidavit of documents. Since this
"compulsory (Bray's term, note 34, supra) affidavit later becomes the basis for
the notice to produce (note 34, supra) the liberality with which documents are
thus discovered and later produced is an excellent indication of the court's
general attitude to these rules. In the quoted case Brett, L.J., stated that "We
desire to Aiake the rule as large as we can with due regard to propriety * * *"(p. 62). "I have put in the words 'either directly or indirectly', because, as it
seems to me, a document can properly be said to contain information which may
enable the party requiring the affidavit either to advance his own case or to
damage the case of his adversary, if it is a document which may fairly lead
him to a train of inquiry * * *" (p. 63). See Bustros v. White, [1876] 1 Q. B..
D. 425; O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A. C. 581, 606, 615, 629; Hutchinson
v. Glover, [1875] 1 Q. B. D. 138, 45 L. J. Q. B. 120, aff'd, 33 L. T. 834 ("It is
objected that it is not clearly shown that the document would be evidence for
plaintiffs. But the fact whether a document would be evidence or not for the
party claiming inspection is not a test to the right to it. Everything which will
throw light on the case is print facie subject to inspection"); Budden v.
Wilkinson, [1893] 2 Q. B. 432; Bewicke v. Graham, [1881] 7 Q. B. D. 400 (to
the effect that it is unnecessary to describe the documents or their nature but
that the phrase "certain documents" is sufficient).
See the following cases for early elaborations upon the term, but not for
definitions: Smith v. Smith, [1745] 3 Atk. 304, 26 Eng. Rep. 977 (letters) ; Price
v. Harrison, [1860] 8 C. B. (N. s.) 617, 141 Eng. Rep. 1308 (letters of which no
copies were kept); Owen v. Nickson, [1861] 3 El. and El. 602, 121 Eng. Rep.
568 (memorandum of agreement); Hill v. Great Western Ry., [1861] 10 C. B.
(x. s.) 148, 142 Eng. Rep. 406 (employer's books) ; Storey v. Lennox, [1836] 1
My. & Cr. 525, 40 Eng. Rep. 476 (documents disclosing name of witness) ; Dinn
v. Brandon, [1885] 1 T. L. R. 598 (exhibit to document in affidavit of docu-
ments), Swanston v. Lishman, [1881] 45 L. T. 360, 4 Asp. M. L. C. 450 (every
document in possession) ; Flight v. Robinson, [1844] 8 Beav. 22, 50 Eng. Rep. 9;
Burton v. Dodd, [1890] 35 Sol. Jo. 39 (solicitor's bill of costs); Jones v.
Richard, [1837] 6 Ad. and El. 530, 112 Eng. Rep. 203 (documents in libel action
required for comparing handwriting); Wilson v. Thornbury, [1874] L. R. 17
Eq. 517; Thornett v. Barclays Bank, [1939] 55 Times Rep. 474; MFws'
DIGEST 606f., 630, 631, 632, and 633; HA-SBURY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 364,
notes c, d, g, h, k; 4 ENCYCLOPAEDiA LAWS OF ENGLAND 836, subd. 2. See also
the following typical cases for colonial discussions: Lindsey v. Le Seur, [1912],
Canada, 3 0. W. R. 851; Minfter v. North of England, [1857], Ireland, 9 Ir.
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broad interpretation given to this term, as well as others
in the rule, an excellent indication of the court's salutary
attitude. 9
Jur. 187; Brash v. Steele, [1845], Scotland, 17 Sc. Jur. 267; Henderson v.
Hedrich, [1892], Scotland, 30 Sc. L. R. 75; Mitchell v. Oriental Gas Co.,
[1866], India, 1 Ind. Jur. (N. s.) 323; Mackenzie v. Furman and Pratt, [1918],
South Africa, W. L. D. 62; McNab v. Wellington, [1914], New Zealand, 33
N. Z. L. R. 1362; Robinson v. Farrar, [1907], South Africa, T. S. 740.
39 See notes 36, 38, supra; Quilter v. Heatly, [1883] 23 Ch. Div. 42 (com-
plaint as pleading) ; Cass v. Fitzgerald, [1884] W. N. 18, Bitt. Rep. in Ch. 178
(bill of particulars as an affidavit or pleading); Milbank v. Milbank, [1900]
1 Ch. 376 (bill of particulars as same) ; Moore v. Peachey, [1891] 2 Q. B. D.
707 (examinations before trial [interrogatories] as an affidavit); Fox v.
Sleeman, [1897], Canada, 17 Ont. Pr. 492 (photographs); Lyell v. Kennedy,
[1884] 27 Ch. D. 1 (refusing on other grounds to permit production of burial
certificates, tombstone, inscriptions, and photographs); Hunter v. D., W. & W.
Ry., [1891], Ireland, 28 L. R. Ir. 489 (exhibits) ; Re Hinchliffe, [1895] 1 Ch.
117 (exhibits) ; Tebutt v. Ambler, [1839] 7 Dowl. 674 (exhibits) ; Pardy's M.
Syndicate, Ltd. v. Alexander, [1903] 1 Ch. 191; Wiedeman v. Walpole, [1890]
24 Q. B. D. 537, 542, re'ld on other grounds, 24 Q. B. D. 626; Re Fenner &
Lord, [1897] 1 Q. B. 667 (letters referred to in arbitrator's affidavit in opposi-
tion to motion to vacate award because of misconduct); R. v. Daye, [1908]
2 K. B. 333 (a sealed packet as a document) ; Campbell v. Woods, etc. [1926],
Canada, 2 W. W. R. 99 ("A bundle of documents"); The Balto, [1917] 86
L. J. P. 83 (sales books); Hamelyn v. White, [1874], Canada, 6 P. R. 143
(books in daily use) ; London City v. Thomaon, [1723] 3 Swan. 265, 36 Eng.
Rep. 856 (city books and by-laws) ; Saxby v. Easterbrook, [1872] L. R. 7 Exch.
207 (books of account) ; M'Corquodale v. Bell, [1876] 1 C. P. D. 471 (following
Cossey v. London, etc., [1870] L. R. 5 C. P. 146 and Skinner v. Gt. Nor. Ry.,
[1874] L. R. 9 Exch. 298, and explaining Fenner v. London, etc., [1872]
L. R. 7 Q. B. 767, holding that even letters to plaintiff's own attorney "in
confidence" are to be produced unless in anticipation, or in aid, of anticipated
litigation).
In the following cases are discussed reports and medical examinations in
personal injury cases: Cossey v. London, etc., supra (distinguishing Baker v.
London, etc., [1867] L. R. 3 Q. B. 91, holding that defendant's medical reports,
obtained before suit, were privileged); Mahony v. National Widows Life,
[1871] L. R. 6 C. P. 252 (holding that reports from friends of the assured
concerning his health and habits were not privileged and could be inspected) ;
Skinner v. Gt. North. Ry., mpra (holding that reports, before or after suit, if
made in course of ordinary duty, are not privileged and must be produced but
if made after claim and company desires medical information as to claimant's
condition such report is privileged); Woolley v. North London Ry., [1869]
L. R. 4 C. P. 602 (inspection permitted of defendant's inspector's report).
On the point of documents prepared regularly, and for litigation, see 4
ENCYCLOPAEDIA LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1907) 688; 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND 72 et seq.; 18 ENG. & EMp. DIG. 120 to 146, pt. III, § 9, subd. I;
9 ENG. RUL. CAs. 586, 595, setting forth Southwark v. Quick, [1878] 3 Q. B.
D. 315. In R. v. Daye, supra, Darling, J., held that "There is a document
wherever there is writing or printing capable of being read, no matter what the
material may be upon which it is impressed or inscribed." In White v. Spafford
& Co., supra note 30, the defendant secured an affidavit of documents and, being
dissatisfied, moved for a further and better one. At p. 247 Collins, L. J., stated
that the defendant's request "clearly relates to a class of documents * * * a
genus, not a species * * * and is certainly not specific." The motion was denied.
See also Roberts v. Dublin United Tramways Co., [1909], Ireland, 43 I. L. T.
203. In Merchants' & Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Davies, sapra, the company sued to
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The rule affirmatively gives the party desiring produc-
tion the right to inspect and to take copies so as to give him
"the same advantage as if the documents referred to had been
fully set out in the pleadings." 40 The onus for justifying a
failure to produce is ulpon the opposite party 41 who can
withhold production only when (1) the document refers to
his own title, he being a defendant, or (2) he has some other
cause or excuse deemed by the court sufficient therefor. A
questioning attitude has arisen with respect to the first ex-
ception, i.e., a defendant's title, the courts feeling that the
distinction is arbitrary and inequitable.42  The friction seems
to have been resolved by the judicial annulment of one por-
tion, and the like amendment of another portion, of Rule 15,
so that justification is now based primarily on the relation
of the documents to the party's case.4 3  Under the second ex-
avoid an insurance policy after an accident had occurred, the defendants now
being the assured and the injured person. The plaintiff's claim was non-
disclosure of material facts in the policy application, i.e., previous motor con-
victions. The injured defendant sought discovery and production of other poli-
cies of plaintiff where disclosure of similar convictions had been made and the
policy nevertheless issued. Held, that the discovery was not material to the
issue raised.
40 Quilter v. Heatly, [1883] 23 Ch. Div. 42.
41 Id. at 51: "In my opinion the onits is on the refusing party ** *." See
also HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 377.
42Roberts v. Oppenheim, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 724. The lower court, by
Mr. Justice Kay, at p. 731, discussed Order 15 as follows: "But the curious
thing in this Order, which I confess I am not at present fully able to understand
is this, that where the excuse is because the document is a document of title the
order seems to say that such excuse may be made by a defendant but not by a
plaintiff. Why? In the nature of things I see no reason in the world for
this. * * *." Cf. Smith v. Harris, note 43, supra, for a decided opinion to the
contrary.
43 Rule 15 states the party in default shall not put the documents "in evi-
dence on his behalf * * * unless * * * such document relates only to his own
title, he being a defendant * * *." (Italics ours.) Roberts v. Oppenheim, note
42, supra, was decided in 1884 and in 1899 the Court of Appeal, in Attorney-
General v. Mayor, etc., 2 Q. B. D. 478, by Smith, L. J., held that "the defendants'
affidavit ought to state that the documents relate solely to the 'case' (instead of
'title') of the defendant corporation, and contain nothing supporting the 'case'
instead of 'title' of the information." Vaughan Williams, L. J., at the same
page, likewise so holds, stating that " * * * I entirely agree with my brother
A. L. Smith, L.J. that the word should be 'case' not 'title' of the defendants
* * *." Cf. Egremont Burial Board v. Egremont Iron, [1880] 14 Ch. D. 158;
Morris v. Edwards, [1890] 15 App. Cas. 309. In Jenkyn v. Bushby, [1866]
35 L. J. Ch. 400, 14 L. T. 431, the court felt that "the word 'title' produces con-
fusion, because, in many cases the plaintiff has no title at all; it is not a question
of title, and the proposition ought to be that the plaintiff is not entitled to any
document that does not tend to make out his case." The cases have likewise
held that in addition to relating only to the party's case, the documents must not
tend to prove or establish or support an opponent's case for then production will
1940 ]
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ception, several grounds for resisting production have devel-
oped which are generally classified 44 as the legal professional
privilege whereby unrestricted communication between liti-
gants and their attorneys has been encouraged; 45 the re-
fusal to compel production of incriminating or penalizing
documents; 4" the state's claim that disclosure is detrimental
to its best interests; 47 the legally ascertainable conclusion
be compelled. Ind., Coope. & Co. v. Emmerson, [1887] 12 App. Cas. 300;
Bewicke v. Graham, [1881] 7 Q. B. D. 400; A.-G. v. Emerson, [1882] 10 Q. B.
D. 191; Budden v. Wilkinson, [1893] 2 Q. B. 432; Milbank v. Milbank, [1900]
1 Ch. 376; Johnson v. Whitaker, [1904] 90 L. T. 535; Jenkyn v. Bushby, .sipra
(' * * * where the plaintiff has any case to make out, he has a right to discovery
of anything that may assist him; and not only so, but to the least title of an
element tending to prove that case") ; Australian Joint Stock Bank v. Steel,
[1890] 11 N. S. W. Eq. 18; Hector v. Canadian Bank, [1896], Canada, 11 Man.
L. R. 320; Von Ferber v. Enright, [1909], Canada, 19 Man. L. R. 383; Power v.
Freeman, [1908], Ireland, 42 I. L. T. 115; 14 ENG. & EMp. DIG. 148; 3 MEWS'
DIGEST 856; 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 85. Cf. Smith v. Harris, [1883]
48 L. T. (N. s.) 869, where the plaintiff objected to production on the ground
that the documents related only to his own title and, at p. 870, Chitty, J., held
that "By the express language of the rule, an objection can only be made where
the documents relate to the title of the defendant, so that the, objection here
stated is not within the exception of the rule."
44 The classification is based upon 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 70,
§ 3. ENCYCLOPAEDIA LAWS OF ENGLAND 687 states "there are five grounds on
which production may be lawfully refused," citing relation to own case, prepared
for litigation, incriminating, belonging to third person, and state documents; 13
ENG. & EM?. DIG. pt. III, § 9, lists nine sub-sections as grounds for resisting
production: legal professional privilege, supporting own case and not aiding
other's, not in sole possession, possession as agent, incrimination, expose to
penalty, to forfeiture, public policy, and corporation books and documents.
7 MEws' DIGEST, "Discovery," under "D. Objections to Disclosure," lists six
grounds.
45 HALSBURY, op. cit. mpra note 31, at 72 et seq.; see note 39, supra;
Greenough v. Gaskell, [1833] 1 My. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618; Herring v. Clo-
bery, [1842] 1 Ph. 91, 41 Eng. Rep. 565; Hamelyn v. White, [1874], Canada, 6
P. R. 143; Stratford v. Hogan, [1812], Ireland, 2 Ball & B. 164; Biggs v. Head,
[1837], Ireland, 1 San. & Sc. 335; Ryrie v. Shiv-Shanker, [1890], India, I. L. R.
15 Bom. 7; McGregor v. Pharazyn, [1902], New Zealand, 22 N. Z. L. R. 414;
Jarvis v. Anderson, [1841], Scotland, 3 DunI. 990. In the Greenough case,
supra, the court held that the attorney could not "be compelled to disclose
papers delivered, or communications made to him, or letters, ot entries made by
him in that capacity." The foundation of the rule "is out of regard to the
interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of
justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in
the practice of the Courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations
which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not
exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources; deprived
of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful
person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case."
46 HALSBURY, Op. cit. supra note 31, at 82 et seq.; see Paxton v. Douglas,
19 Ves. 225, 16 Ves. 239, 12 R. R. 175; Claridge v. Hoare, 14 Ves. 65; Mac-
callum v. Turton, 2 Y. & J. 183; cf. Sitwell v. Sun Engraving Co., [1937] 4
All. E. R. 366.
47 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 84f. See Kain v. Farrer, [1877] 37
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that the party has not the sole legal possession or property
in the documents; 48 the possession of documents merely as
an agent of a third (disinterested) party; 49 that the docu-
ments relate solely to the party's case; 50 and that the par-
ticular production is unduly oppressive to the party. 1
The consequence attendant upon non-compliance with
the notice, is that the party "shall not afterwards be at lib-
erty to put any such document in evidence on his behalf"
unless the two previous exceptions apply. Preclusion may
be preferable to disclosure, 52 and it would thus appear that
a refusal to produce pursuant to order should not be punish-
able save in such respect. Rule 21, however, states that non-
compliance "with any order * * * for discovery or inspection
of documents" makes the party "liable to attachment." Under
Rule 18(1) an order may be made, if Rule 15 is not complied
with, "for inspection in such place and in such manner as he
(the Judge) may think fit", and under Rule 18 (2) the ap-
plication, if based upon Rule 15, need not be founded upon
an affidavit. This dilemma is still existent, and although it
may have been partially solved,53 the general problem re-
L. T. 469; H. M. S. Bellerophon, [1874] 44 L. J. Adm. 5; Beatson v. Skene,
[1860] 5 H. & N. 838, 29 L. J. Ex. 430; Admiralty Commrs. v. Aberdeen,
[1909] S. C. 335.
48 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 85; ANNUAL PRACrICE (1940) 543f.
49 HALSBURY, op. Cit. supra note 31, at 86f.GO HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 87. While this appears to parallel
the first exception, still the differentiating terms "title" and "case", as well as the
exclusion of "defendant", place it in the second category. It is thus entirely
plausible to argue that even though one is a plaintiff, and the documents, etc.
relate to one's "case", not "title", still production should not be compelled by
virtue of this second exception.
51 HALSBURY, op. cit. mtpra note 31, at 88. See Macintosh v. G. W. Ry.,
[1853] 22 L. J. Ch. 182, 160 Eng. Rep. 389; Janson v. Solarte, [1849] 2 Y. & C.
132, 6 L. J. Ex. Eq. 75; Mansell v. Feeney, [1861] 2 John & H. 320, 70 Eng. Rep.
1079. A utilitarian attitude seems to have been adopted in that, unless required
by the demanding party, conflicting considerations will be weighed and the
decision influenced thereby. Thus great expense or trouble will outweigh mere
curiosity even when founded upon a legal right, unless other factors enter.52Roberts v. Oppenheim, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 724, 735 ("That is the penalty.
He may prefer to lose part of his claim rather than produce the document. In
my opinion, that rule [Rule 15] does not take away the privilege of the docu-
ments, but only prevents them from being put in evidence unless produced").
53In Milbank v. Milbank, [1900] 1 Ch. Div. 376, the court held that par-
ticulars as an amendment of or supplement to the pleading, might be ordered
and failed to pass upon this very point raised on the appeal. However, this case
fortunately was one wherein the document was referred to in the pleading,
leaving the question as to affidavits, etc., still open. In Webster v. Whewall,
[1880] 15 Ch. Div. 120, plaintiff sued on trespass and in his complaint referred
to a certain deed. Defendant gave notice to produce which was declined until
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mains. It is submitted that the raison d'etre of the English
procedure is best served where the sole penalty for non-
production, by notice or order, is that set forth in Rule 15.
To determine the rights of the parties prior to trial, Rule 18
provides for an immediate judicial hearing to decide ques-
tions of "cause" and exceptions, and is availed of regularly
because parties "ought not to have waited to the trial of
the action to exclude so material a document." 54 Where an
after a defense had been interposed. On the trial defendant objected to intro-
duction in evidence of this deed and Denman, J., held that "it relates to the
Plaintiff's title only." He further held as a "sufficient cause" the current deci-
sions holding no "free access to documents" by a defendant till after answer.
"Besides, the Defendant had a remedy under the 17th rule" (now 18th), "and
he ought not to have waited to the trial of the action to exclude so material a
document." This decision was upheld in Quilter v. Heatly, [1883] 23 Ch. Div.
42, but the reasons frowned upon. In the Quilter case plaintiff sued in equity
to compel the transfer of shares allegedly contracted for and to obtain certain
monies. The complaint referred to documents and letters and, before answer,
defendant served a notice to produce which was denied on the strength of the
Webster case. On appeal Jessel, M.R., held that as to those documents set forth
in the complaint production might be had immediately, but as to certain letters
written by plaintiff, copies only of which had been demanded, and which "copies
are not referred to in the complaint," no production before answer would be
granted even though "The plaintiff probably has copies * * *." Lindley, L. J.,
at p. 49 likewise held that "There is a broad distinction between a general
application for discovery of documents relating to the matters in question in the
action and an application for production of documents referred to in the plead-
ings." Discovery is "not to be given as a matter of course before a defence
* * *. But as to documents referred to in the pleadings the case is different."
And Bowen, L.J., likewise held that "The machinery for the production of
documents is of two kinds." See Note (1933) 2 BROOKLYN L. REv. 224, 239f.
(where the Quilter case is referred to as seemingly upholding the proposition
that "a general reference to the document is sufficient to warrant the application
of Section 327 and it is not necessary that the documents be specifically
described." This is a correct enunciation of the English law but the writer's
following digest of the Quilter case, as supporting the general legal conclusion,
is erroneous).
54 Webster v. Whewall, [1880] 15 Ch. Div. 120. Although this is dictum
according to the Quilter case, s,.pra note 53, still the court there stated that "I
think no Judge on the bench would have excluded in evidence the deed there in
question, though he might not have given the same reasons for admitting it."
The original Act (1875 amendment) made extensive alterations upon the provi-
sionally adopted one (1873) and such recourse to a judge became an integral
part in the procedure then adopted and thereafter followed. When recourse is
had to the previous Chancery practice added justification is obtained for these
views.
The practice in today's Chancery Division differs from that of the King's
Bench Division with respect to inspection by the court. Under Rule 19A(2),
adopted in 1894, where privilege is claimed and an application to inspect is made,
"it shall be lawful for the Court or Judge to inspect the document for the
purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege." "Privilege"
includes any objection to inspection, i.e., irrelevancy, public policy, etc., see
Ehrmann v. Ehrmann, [1896] 2 Ch. 826; Robinson v. State, [1931], Australia,
W. N. 147, P. C. The claim of privilege is never waived, even by reference to
the document in a pleading, and is always a judicial question. Roberts v. Oppen-
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order or default is based upon a party's then lack of knowl-
edge or non-possession, and subsequently the document is
found or obtained, a supplemental notice is proper.55
II.
The principles enunciated above are part of the common
law which enshrouds this country.56 The various state enact-
ments and decisions relating to discovery find their basis in
the equitable bill of discovery 57 as interpreted in each jnris-
heim, [1884] 26 Ch. 724; Infields, Ltd. v. Rosen & Son, [1938] 3 All. E. R.
591, 597. Where a Master in Chancery attempts to decide this question
it can nevertheless be adjourned as of right to a judge who must decide it
de novo; in the King's Bench a judge never obtains a matter from a master
save as an appeal. Infields, Ltd. v. Rosen & Son, szpra, at 591, editorial note
and case.
55 In Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Co., [1884] 1 Cababe & Ellis 215,
rev'd on other grounds, 14 Q. B. D. 125, reversal upheld in Darley Main
Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, [1886] 11 App. Cas. 127, plaintiff sued for damages to
realty and "under the usual form for discovery, the defendants made * * * the
usual affidavit of documents. * * * In the schedule thereto no mention was made
of the diary (used quite effectively upon the trial), the fact being that at the
time its existence was unknown to or forgotten by the defendants. Within two
or three weeks, however, and long before the trial, it was discovered * * * " by
the defendants but never disclosed, and later made the basis for much of defen-
dant's trial testimony. "Now, in my opinion, a party who, after filing an
affidavit of documents, discovers a document of which his opponent has a right
to have inspection, but which is not disclosed in the schedule because it has been
forgotten, or overlooked, or supposed not to exist, is bound to inform his
opponent of the discovery either by a supplementary affidavit, which I think is
the proper course, or at least by notice; and he has no right to keep back all
knowledge of the newly-discovered document simply because he was not aware
of it at the time he swore his affidavit in obedience to the order for discovery."
See also Campbell v. McArthur, [1876], Canada, 7 0. P. R. 46; HALSBURY,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 61.56 With Louisiana as' the exception. See N. Y. CNST. 1775, art. XXXV.
57 James, Jr., Discovery (1929) 38 YAE L. J. 749. This article discusses
the manner in which the equitable bill has influenced statutory provisions,
enumerates actions in which discovery may be had together with its extent and
the grounds for resisting, and likewise sets forth the machinery therefor. The
several states in the Union are discussed, and the English rules and decisions
are referred to inter alia. At p. 770f. reference is made to Rule 15 of the
ENGLISH Onms, and at p. 771 it is stated that "No American state has adopted
the machinery of the English courts as provided in Order xxxi to any great
extent. New York has enacted Rules 15 and 19A(3) (N. Y. Civ. PaMc. AcT
§§ 326, 328 sic, and Massachusetts provides for the inspection of documents
referred to in the pleadings or bill of particulars unless the court is satisfied
that there is a reasonable excuse for their non-production. Both the Massachu-
setts Judicature Commission and the American Judicature Society, however,
favor the adoption of the English method of obtaining discovery of documents,
with minor variations." Mr. James states that New York's corresponding sec-
tions to the English Rules 15 and 19A(3) are, respectively, N. Y. CMv. P Ac.
AcT §§ 326 and 328. He is in error with respect to the corresponding New York
section for Rule 15, which is § 327 and not § 326. New York has also adopted
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diction.58 Although discovery is now a matter of common
motion practice, the question of inspection upon mere notice
(save when a recusant party compels application to effectuate
its provisions) is still in an incipient stage. The several
state discovery enactments r9 disclose a regrettable lack of
portions of Order 32 with respect to "Admissions" which are incorporated in
§§ 323 and 324, the punishment § 325 likewise containing other portions. These
are not pertinent here and are not discussed.
Mr. James further holds that punishment for refusal to produce is exclu-
sion, and in footnote 175 at p. 771 states that "In England it is provided that
where a document is properly sought it shall be excluded from evidence if not
produced, there being no excuse for non-production," citing Rule 15. This,
however, is not exactly correct. We have heretofore seen that a document may
be "properly sought" but refused because of many privileges or excuses. Fur-
ther, in Webster v. Whewall, 11880] 15 Ch. Div. 120, supra note 53, the refer-
ence to a document was unquestioned, the notice properly given, the document
properly sought, and the trial objection properly made, yet the court permitted
the document in evidence, suggesting pre-trial recourse to other methods either
to force production or obtain preclusion.
58 The FFD. RULES OF CIv. PROc. have adopted Rule 34, which follows:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all
other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party
to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody, or control * * *." Inspection is thus
impossible save by an order upon notice and, in construing this rule it has been
held that an interrogatory, treated as an inspection under the new rule, "is
defective in that it seeks an inspection of the defendant's products which is too
broad and sweeping, and does not designate with sufficient particularity the
objects which he w ants to examine, nor does he make any showing that all of
the matters that he wants to inspect constitute or contain material evidence."
Pierce v. Submarine Signal Co., 25 F. Supp. 862, 864 (D. C. Mass. 1939). See,
however, the statement that "The requirement of materiality does not, however,
compel the person seeking discovery definitely to prove materiality before being
entitled to a discovery," Beler v. Saverona Ship Corp., 26 F. Supp. 599 (E. D.
N. Y. 1939), and compare with the statement that it is the duty of the judge to
"examine every document before determining" materiality, and that no right to
inspect exists "in advance of a determination that they constitute or contain
evidence material to one or more of the issues in this case." United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 26 F. Supp. 711, 712 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). In another
case the court was "informed by (defendant's) counsel that a letter dated April
11 in some unstated year and purporting to be signed by A. G. Monks is also
material to the cause," and thereupon permitted inspection. Monks v. Hurley,
28 F. Supp. 600 (D. C. Mass. 1939).
The pertinent sections with reference to discovery are set forth in RAG-
LAND'S DIscovERY at 267 et seq. Ragland, writing in 1932, before the Federal
Rules were enacted, has set forth the equity rules which are now found in these
new rules. For an excellent treatment see Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial
Under tire New Federal Rules (1939) 15 TENN. L. REv. 737, discussing Rule 34
at p. 750f.5 9 Alabama: Code adopted 1923, § 7774, production of "books, documents,
or writings in their possession, custody, control or power" by order after motion
on notice; Arizona: REvisED CODE OF 1928, § 4465, requiring production of "any
book, document, or paper" by order after motion on notice; Arkansas: DIGEST
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uniformity, and principles seem to have been sacrificed for
OF 1937, §§ 5147-5153, providing for production in law and in equity, by order
after motion on notice; California: CODE OF CIv. PROC., adopted 1872 with
amendments to 1937, § 1000, permitting inspection by order after motion on
notice. This statute is extremely popular and, where not adopted verbatim
elsewhere, is but mildly changed. It is set forth in full and wherever the
general phrase "production and inspection by order after motion on notice"
appears the general principles of this section are meant: "Any court in which
an action is pending, or a judge or justice thereof may, upon notice, order either
party to give to the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy or
permission to take a copy, of entries of accounts in any book, or of any docu-
ment or paper in his possession or under his control, containing evidence relating
to the merits of the action, or the defense therein. If compliance with the order
be refused, the court may exclude the entries of accounts of the book, or the
document, or paper from being given in evidence, or if wanted as evidence by
the party applying may direct the jury to presume them to be such as he alleges
them to be; and the court may also punish the party refusing for a contempt.
This section is not to be construed to prevent a party from compelling another
to produce books, papers, or documents when he is examined as a witness";
Colorado: REv. STAT. OF 1935, § 390, permitting inspection by order after
motion on notice; Connecticut: GEN. STAT. OF 1930, c. 293, § 5635, permitting
inspection by order after motion on notice; Delaware: RULES OF THE COURT OF
CHANCERY, with amendments to 1932, Rule 34, permitting production and inspec-
tion by order after motion on notice; Florida: Comp. LAws OF 1927, Second
Division, tit. 1, c. 15, art. 2, § 4405, production and inspection by order after
motion on notice; Georgia: CODE OF 1933, c. 38, §§ 38-1201, permit discovery
"in any case pending in any court" at law; §§ 38-1101 give the equity courts
these powers; §§ 38-801 state: "The several courts shall have power, on notice
and proof thereof having been previously given by the opposite party or his
attorney, to require either party to produce books (etc.) * * * under circum-
stances where such party might be compelled to produce the same by the
ordinary rules of proceedings in equity"; the sixth section of the GA. JUD. AcT
OF 1799 stated: "The said Courts shall have power, on the trial of causes
cognizable before them, respectively, on ten days' notice, and proof thereof
being previously given to the opposite party or his * * * attorney, on motion to
require either party to produce books (etc.) * * * under circumstances where
such party might be compelled to produce the same, by the ordinary rules of
proceedings in Equity * * *." In Trustees of Harvard College v. Pace, 15 Ga.
486 (1854), the court at p. 488 stated the question in the case to be "at what
time may the motion to produce, which is by these words given, consequent
upon a notice, be made?" In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 806,
12 S. E. 18 (1890), the court discussed a letter "which the defendant wished to
use in evidence. Notice to produce it had been given. By consent of parties
plaintiff's counsel retained possession of it, but with a promise to produce it
when desired. * * *." On the trial it was refused on demand "Whereupon the
court was moved to compel its production." From the present §§ 38-801, and
those following, it appears that the courts are given power to compel production
and permit inspection by order after notice. Mere notice to produce, per se, is
insufficient; Idaho: CODE OF 1932, tit. 12, c. 3, §§ 12-302, production and inspec-
tion by order after motion on notice; Illinois: REv. STAT. OF 1939, c. 51, § 9,
gives "The several courts" power "upon motion (after notice), and good and
sufficient cause shown" to order production; c. 110, § 182 grants "discovery of
documents which are or have been in the possession of any other party to the
action * * *"; Indiana: 2 BURNS' ANN. STAT. 2-1644 and 2-1645, production
and inspection by order after motion on notice; Iowa: CODE OF 1935, § 11316,
production and inspection by order after motion on notice; Kansas: GEN. STAT.
OF 1935, c. 60, § 2850. The early 1859 GEN. LAws, c. 25, § 370, follows: Either
party or his attorney may demand of the adverse party an inspection and copy,7
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expediency. In but two instances have states partaken of
or permission to take a copy, of a book, paper or document in his possession or
under his control, containing evidence or relating to the merits of the action or
defense therein. Such demand shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper
or document, with sufficient particularity to enable the other party to distinguish
it, and if compliance with the demand within four days be refused, the court or
judge, on motion and notice to the adverse party, may in their discretion order
the adverse party to give the other, within a specified time, an inspection and
copy, or permission to take a copy, of such book, paper or document; and, on
failure to comply with such order, the court may exclude the paper or document
from being given in evidence, or, if wanted as evidence by the party applying,
may direct the jury to presume it to be such as the party by affidavit alleges it
to be. This section is not to be construed to prevent a party from compelling
another to produce any book, paper or document when he is examined as a
witness." This statute is in force today with minor changes which are insignifi-
cant, and forms the basis for the similar enactments in Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Ohio, and Wyoming. See discussion in note 60, infra; Kentucky: CARxoU.'s
CODE OF PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES (7th ed. 1927) § 527: "A writing purporting
to have been made by a party, if referred to in, and filed with a pleading of his
adversary, may be read as genuine against him, unless he deny its genuineness
by affidavit before the trial is begun." Aside from the following § 528 (sub-
poena duces tecutn), nothing further can be found. It would thus appear as if
Kentucky has no specific statute upon the subject; Louisiana: DAT's ANN.
CODE OF PRAC., to date, art. 917: Supreme Court, when required by a party, can
direct individuals "to produce before it any title deeds, papers or documents
relating to suits which are in their possession * * *" (art. 473, production for
trial) ; Maine: REV. STAT. OF 1930, c. 91, § 45, permitting a bill for discovery in
equity; c. 96, § 23: "Where books, papers, or written instruments material to
the issue in any action at law pending in the superior court, are in the possession
of the opposite party, and .access thereto refused, the court upon motion, notice,
and hearing, may require their production for inspection. * * *" Although the
phrase "access thereto refused" might imply a notice to produce such inference
is erroneously drawn. The denial merely operates as a procedural technicality
and the court must first determine materiality, etc. before the order is made;
Maryland: PUB. GEN. LAWS OF 1924, art. 16, § 165, permits equity bills for
discovery to lie; art. 75, § 106, permits law courts to require production and
inspection by order on motion after notice "or to answer any bill of discovery";
Massachusetts: ANN. LAWS c. 231, § 68: "Every party to any cause or pro-
ceeding may inspect and takes copies of any document referred to in the plead-
ing or particulars of any other party and relied on by such other party, unless
the court is satisfied that the same is not in his possession or control or that he
has some other reasonable excuse for not producing the same for such inspec-
tion, and the court may make orders for production for said purposes, enforce-
able in like manner as orders to answer interrogatories." There are no annota-
tions to this section save a reference to 21 MAss. L. Q., No. 3, p. 26, which
merely refers to, but does not construe or discuss it; Michigan: Comp. LAWS OF
1929, tit. XXVII, c. 266, "The Judicature Act", § 13543 (§ 17) : "The supreme
court shall have power, in all such cases, to compel any party to any suit pending
therein, to produce and discover books, papers and documents in his possession
or power, relating to the merits of any such suit, or of any defense therein."
§ 13549 (§ 23) : "The books, papers and documents produced under any order
made in pursuance of the preceding sections, shall have the same effect, when
used by the party requiring them, as if produced upon notice, according to the
practice of the court"; Minnesota: MASON'S STAT. OF 1927, c. 92, § 9886: "The
court * * * may order either party to give * * * an inspection and copy * * * of
any book, document, or paper in his possession or under his control, containing
evidence relating to the merits of the case. * * * "; Mississippi: CODE OF 1930,
c. 19, § 744: "The court * * * on good cause shown, and after notice * * * (may
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the English experience and seemingly adopted the procedure
order) an inspection and (to) copy * * * any books, papers, or documents in
his possession or under his control containing evidence relating to the merits of
the action or proceeding or of the defense thereto * * * "; Missouri: REv. STAT.
OF 1929, art. 13, § 924, grants power to every court to compel production; § 925
states order to show cause why production should not be compelled is granted
on an affidavit; the following sections give the penalty for refusal to produce,
etc.; Montana: REv. CODES OF 1935, c. 84, § 9771, production and discovery on
order after motion on notice; Nebraska: CoMp. STAT. OF 1929, c. 20, art. 12,
§ 70 (numbered 20-1270), permits the courts to "require the production of any
papers or books which are material * * * for the purpose of being inspected and
copied * * *." § 71 sets forth the contents required in the petition, and § 72 the
penalty. § 67 (numbered 20-1267) is identical with the 1859 Kansas enactment
which has been amended in Kansas, and elsewhere, by the addition of a "to".
The Nebraska statute is the only one following the early Kansas statute so
assiduously. See further discussion, infra, note 60, re other states; Nevada:
Comp. LAWS OF 1929, c. 53, § 8963, discovery and production by order after
motion on notice; New Hampshire: PuB. LAWS OF 1926, c. 317, § 1, giving the
superior court "powers of a court of equity in * * * discovery * * *." Chapter
336, § 25, "No party shall be compelled * * * in giving a deposition, to produce
any writing which is material to his case or defense, unless the deposition is
taken in his own behalf"; New Jersey: N. J. STAT. ANN., to 1939, tit. 2, "Ad-
ministration of Civil and Criminal Justice, Court Rules," 2:1-1 to 2:23-end,
App., Rules of Court of Chancery, at p. 368, Rule 85, "Any party may, without
affidavit, apply for an order directing any other party to make discovery on
oath, of the books, papers or other documents, which are or have been in his
possession or under his control, relating to any matter in question in the cause.
The granting of the order shall be discretionary as to the whole or any part of
the discovery applied for." Tit. 2, c. 27, art: 15, § 169 (numbered 2:27-169),
"The-court * * * or a judge may, on four days' notice and upon terms, order
either party to give * * * an inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy,
of such books, papers or documents in his possession or under his control as are
or contain evidence relating to the merits * * * "; New Mexico: STAT. OF 1929,
ANN., c. 105, art. 5, § 522 (numbered 105-522), holding "When any instrument
or writing upon which the action or defense is founded is referred to in the
pleadings" and is not attached to it or else filed, it "shall not be admitted in
evidence upon the trial." The following section states that a reference in a
pleading to a written instrument, When it is incorporated in or attached to the
pleading, is an admission of its genuineness unless the paper is denied in a
pleading or writing, "Provided, that if the party desiring to controvert the
same is, upon reasonable demand, refused an inspection of such instrument, the
execution thereof shall not be deemed admitted by failure to deny the same under
oath. Such demand must be in writing filed in the cause, and served upon the
opposite party or his attorney"; North Carolina: CODE OF 1927, c. 12, art. 44,
§ 899, abolishes actions to obtain discovery; by c. 35, art. 9, § 1823, courts are
empowered to grant orders to inspect and copy on motion after notice (§ 1824,
production of books or writings on motion and due notice) ; North Dakota:
ComP. LAWS OF 1913, CODE OF CIV. PRoc. c. 18, § 7861, discovery and production
by order after motion on notice. By c. 110 of the Laws, approved March, 1939,
a Code Revision Commission is created to report by January, 1941; Ohio: GEN.
CoDE ANN. 1926, § 11551, discovery and production by order after motion on
notice. § 11552, With slight changes is, verbatim, the Kansas enactment, supra.
The Ohio sections do not contain "in their discretion" when it gives the court
or judge power to compel, etc., but, since it gives substantially the same relief
production, as formerly given in chancery by the bill of discovery, Ward v. Steel
Co., 17 0. N. P. (N. s.) 331, 26 0. D. (N. P.) 569, the court's discretion is always
a vital factor in granting and limiting orders, Arbuckle v. Spice Co., 21 0. C. C.
347, 11 0. C. D. 743. Where a party alleges the book, etc. "is of mere private
1940 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
interest, or of such character that it ought not to be produced" the court may
direct a master's inspection (§ 11553) ; Oklahona: STAT. OF 1931, c. 2, art. 12,
§ 317, is, verbatim, the Kansas enactment except that a minor "to", and some
commas, are included'; Oregon: CODE OF 1930, CODE OF Crv. PRoc. tit. 7, c. 2, § 3
(numbered 7-203), production and inspection by order after motion on notice.
In State ex rel. Cawrse v. Am. Sur. Co., 148 Ore. 1, 35 P. (2d) 487 (1934),
defendant interposed an equitable defense for discovery. The Supreme Court
affirmed a dismissal of such defense because it knew "of no reason why the
documents mentioned in the cross-complaint cannot be adequately examined in
the law action (pursuant to the above-cited section) without necessity for a
discovery as granted in courts of chancery"; Pennsylvania: PulDON's PA.
STAT., ANN., tit. 28, § 61, giving the courts power to compel production by order
on motion after due notice "and upon good and sufficient cause shown * *
This section has not usurped the equitable remedy of a bill of discovery. York-
shire Worsted Mills v. Nat. Transit Co., 325 Pa. 427, 190 At1. 897 (1937);
Spiegel v. C. K. Williams & Co., 24 North. 297 (1934); Rhode Itland: GEN.
LAWS OF 1938, c. 538, § 8, giving law and equity courts power to order produc-
tion on motion after notice. The section is declaratory of the common law and
a substitute for the cumbersome equity bill, Hemenway v. Hemenway, 28 R. I.
85, 65 Ati. 608 (1906) ; Arnold v. Pawtuxet, 18 R. I. 189, 26 Atl. 55 (1893), but
does not abolish the equitable bill. Clark v. R. I. Loc. Works, 24 R. I. 307,
53 Atl. 47 (1902); South Carolina: CODE OF LAWS OF 1932, CODE OF CIv. PROC.
c. 38, § 673, permitting the court or a judge "in their discretion, and upon due
notice, (to) order * * * an inspection and copy * * * of any books, papers, and
documents in his possession, or under his control, containing evidence * * *."
Section 674 abolishes discovery actions; South Dakota: CoDE OF 1939, tit. 33,
c. 33.34, § 7 (numbered 33.3407), stating that when the cause or counterclaim
"arises upon an account or instrument for the payment of money only" the
court can order production and inspection, and delivery of a copy, of the
original, the penalty being non-introduction in evidence; Tennessee: CODE OF
1932, pt. III, tit. 3, c. 7, § 9868 et seq., entitling each party in lawsuits to dis-
covery, and the following sections prescribe a motion procedure which differs
from the equitable bill practically in name only; Texas: VERNON'S STAT. 1936,
tit. 42, c. 2, art. 2002, "All trial courts shall entertain suits in the nature of bills
of discovery, and grant relief therein in accordance with the usages of courts of
equity. Such remedy shall be cumulative of all other remedies"; Utah: Rv.
STAT. 1933, tit. 104, c. 53, § 2 (numbered 104-53-2), "Any court in which an
action is pending, or a judge thereof, may, upon notice, order either party to
give to the other within a specified time, a copy, or permission to take a copy, of
entries of account in any book, or of any document or paper in his possession or
under his control, containing evidence relating to the merits of the action or the
defense therein." Punishment is non-introduction, etc.; Vermont: PUB. LAws
1933, tit. 9, c. 77, § 1854; courts in the trial of actions at law may "on motion
and due notice thereof given, require the parties to produce books or writings
in their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue or
relative to the action, where they might be compelled to produce the same by the
ordinary rules and proceedings in chancery * * *." In Vermont Farm Mach.
Co. v. Batchelder & Co., 68 Vt. 430, 35 AtI. 378 (1896), plaintiff sued for the
purchase price of a cream separator. Defendant contended the separator used
more fuiel than one called an Alpha separator, which had been tested with the
plaintiff's. During the tests plaintiff's representative there (who at the
time of the trial had become an Alpha representative) wrote plaintiff the
tests were unfavorable to their machine and plaintiff responded. Defendant
produced this person on the trial as their witness and plaintiff's letters and tele-
grams to him were offered in evidence. He then testified he had replied and
defendant requested plaintiff to produce the replies and, upon refusal, the court
so ordered. On appeal the court held the chancery court had power to direct
production of documents proving a party's own case but not those proving the
other's and affirmed; Virginia: CODE OF 1930, tit. 60, c. 261, § 6236ff. Under
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outlined in Rule 15,60 although even in these two states only
§ 6236 a party in law cases may file interrogatories with the clerk who issues a
summons to the other party who must answer, if they are relevant, or else judg-
ment or dismissal be entered against him. Under § 6237, in law cases, a party
may file an affidavit with the clerk stating his belief that the other party has
books, etc., describing them with reasonable certainty, containing material evi-
dence for him. A summons is issued arid the procedure generally paralleled the
preceding section. Under § 6238 a bill of discovery in chancery is permitted
unless the preceding sections have been utilized; Washington: REMINGTON'S
REv. STAT. ANN., 1932, § 1262, production and inspection by order after motion
on notice; West Virginia: CODE OF 1931, c. 57, art. 5, § 3 (keyed as 57-5-3-),
"In any case at law, upon a party making affidavit that a particular book of
accounts, or other writing, or paper is important for him to have in the trial of
his cause, he may procure from the clerk * * * " a subpoena duces tecurn return-
able in court on a day certain. The penalty is attachment to compel production,
and either dismissal or judgment; Wisconsin: STAT. 1937, § 269.57, permitting
an order upon motion after "due notice and cause shown" to inspect "property
or * * * copy * * * books and documents," etc. The Circuit Court Rule 18
(the only copy available to this writer is that found in 108 Northwestern Re-
porter, at page xiii) provides for the manner in which the application is to be
brought. See McDermott, Discovery Examination Before Trial History, Scope
and Practice (1936) 21 MARQ. L. REv. 1. The original discovery enactment is
found in REv. STAT. 1858, c. 137, § 54f; Wymning: REv. STAT. 1931, c. 89, art.
17, § 29f. (numbered 89-1729 and 89-1730), which are practically, verbatim, the
Kansas, and other, enactments, supra, heretofore referred to. In § 89-1730 is
found, however, this added word: "Either party, or his attorney, may also
demand * * * ".
60 New York and Massachusetts. The New Mexico section is a special
case of production and inspection on notice, for there an instrument must be
first pleaded (by setting forth in full in, or being annexed to, the pleading) and
then, if not denied, is deemed genuine unless, as an exception to this general
rule (in this particular instance), an inspection of the instrument has been
refused before interposing a pleading or affidavit.
The Ohio statute has been construed in several jurisdictionS. (The Wyo-
ming statute, immediately following its section, has a line "Similar to PAGE'S
OHIO CODE, § 11552, to which following Ohio decisions apply." The Oklahoma
enactment, under "History", refers to an earlier Kansas section and incorporates
Kansas cases in its annotations. The striking similarity among these various
sections renders applicable to each the others' decisions.) In Stark Rolling Mill
v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Co., 11 Ohio Circuit Court Reports (N. s.) 443, 20
C. D. 4 (1908), the defendant in error brought "an action in the nature of a bill
of discovery" against the plaintiff in error. The appellate court held that
"§§ 5289, 5290 (now § 11552), 5101, REv. STAT., afford ample means for obtain-
ing an inspection of the books or papers of an adversary, and should be resorted
to rather than to apply to a court of equity. We think these statutes are as
broad as the old chancery practice and provide a method of procedure, and that
method must be pursued, and in holding otherwise the court of common pleas
erred * * *." In Marshall v. Rowe, 126 Neb. 817, 832, 254 N. W. 480 (1934),
the court held that "in view of these statutory enactments (including § 20-1267,
under discussion here) it becomes obvious that the reasons which necessitated
the former eqbity practice have passed away." The various sections thus relate
to the chancery practice and procedure they displace and the rules as to evidence,
possession, materiality, etc., apply. London v. Morehead, 34 Okla. 701, 126
Pac. 1027 (1912); Richards v. Bunte, 115 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. s.) 401. The
application of the instant section, as well as the others, to criminal cases has
been discussed in Ohio. In State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio 397, 91 N. E. 186 (1910),
State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio 214, 147 N. E. 3 (1925), and State v. Hahn, 59 Ohio
App. 178, 17 N. E. (2d) 392 (1938), appeal disnissed, 133 Ohio 440, 14 N. E.
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one has adopted the English rule and practice in its entirety.61
(2d) 354 (1938), the courts declined to permit its use. In State v. Fox, 133
Ohio 154, 12 N. E. (2d) 413 (1938), however, it was decided that defendants
could inspect their written confession then in possession of the district attorney.
See also State v. Hinkley, 81 Kan. 838, 106 Pac. 1088 (1910) ; State v. Jeffries,
117 Kan. 742, 232 Pac. 873 (1925); State v. Furthmyer, 128 Kan. 317, 321,
277 Pac. 1019 (1929). It would appear that the demand portion of the section
lays the basis for rejection of the original document, Powers v. Sumbler, 83
Kan. 1, 4, 110 Pac. 97 (1910), in which event oral evidence, or copies, of the
original can be introduced, Cooley v. Gilliam, 80 Kan. 278, 102 Pac. 1091(1909), McCormick v. Roberts, 32 Kan. 68, 3 Pac. 753 (1884), otherwise not,
Barton-Parker Mfg. v. Miller Merc. Co., 18 Okla. 137, 89 Pac. 1128 (1907),
State Ins. Co. v. Belford, 2 Kan. 280, 42 Pac. 409 (1895). Where the refusing
party recants and produces the documents before and at the trial, secondary
evidence is inadmissible, Sallander v. Prairie Life Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 629, 200
N. W. 344 (1924). It is discretionary whether the court should, upon the appli-
cation, order the production or direct exclusion, Chamberlain v. Chamberlain
Banking House, 93 N. W. 1021 (Neb. 1903), although in the latter portion of
the section the court can order the jury to presume the document is as set forth
in the demanding party's affidavit, Sallander v. Prairie Life Ins. Co., 110 Neb.
332, 193 N. W. 737 (1923).
61 New York follows the English rule practically verbatim. The Massa-
chusetts enactment is set forth in full, supra note 59, and, with but minor
changes for grammatical correctness, is, verbatim, Section 4 of Chapter 146
of the GEN. AcTs OF 1915. There are apparently no reported decisions on this
section but the Judicature Commission appointed under c. 223, GEN. Acrs OF
1919, rendered its "Second and Final Report" in 1921 and undoubtedly had
before it the instant section. In such Report [(1921) 6 MAss. L. Q.] the
Commissioners discussed interrogatories and discovery and, at page 110, stated,
with respect to documentary production and inspection as is here discussed, that
"We recommend a provision for an affidavit of documents upon the written
demand of either party * * *" and, at page 153, set forth a suggested act
"Relative to the Discovery of Documents." This was never adopted although
it provided that a party "may by filing a demand therefor require an adverse
party to make discovery on oath of all documents admissible in evidence * * *
which are or have been in his possession or power. * * * the party * * * shall
file a schedule under oath * * * and, if not still in his possession or power, state
what has become of them and in whose possession or power they are. Such
affidavit shall specify which, if any, of the documents therein mentioned he
objects to produce, and thereafter the court may make an order with regard to
the time and methods of production and the right of the demanding party to
make copies, as justice may require. * * *" This is to a certain extent similar
to N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 328, and partakes of the English procedure to a
certain extent. Aside from this suggested improvement the 1915 Massachusetts
enactment remains in force.
It would appear, from a careful reading of the section (c. 231, § 68) that
the "being entitled" is given to a party to "inspect and take copies" of documents,
etc., unless non-possession or another "reasonable excuse" is given. Since "the
court may make orders for production for said purposes," it is this writer's
opinion that merely a qualified right, subject to exceptions, is given a party to
inspect another's documents if and when the court permits. The "being entitled,"
as previously said, is given a party when two conditions, reference and reliance,
are met; qualifications are then set forth as exceptions, i.e., "unless"; and finally
the court "may" permit the inspection by "orders" "enforceable in like manner
as orders to answer interrogatories." It is submitted that this section is a
fictitious grant of additional power for, under the chancery practice, discovery
can be had of much more than the qualified permission where reference is had
in a "pleading or particular." The Massachusetts section is therefore not
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This latter state, New York, is thus the sole American lab-
oratory in which production on notice can be evaluated.
The original inability of the law courts to grant discov-
ery was, as has been seen, overcome by the circuitous strategy
of an equitable bill therefor. Such cumbersome procedure
granted discovery in the auxiliary case after which the par-
ties returned to the stayed law case. This unnecessary shift-
ing was reduced, to a degree, by permitting the equitable
prayer to request additional relief after the discovery had
been granted, which additional relief might conceivably be
that requested in the pending law case.6 2  In New York, the
Revised Statutes of 1829 empowered the law courts to grant
discovery directly "in such cases as shall be deemed proper
(and) to compel any party to a suit pending therein, to pro-
duce and discover books, papers and documents in his posses-
sion or power, relating to the merits of any such suit, or of
any defence therein." 63 The succeeding revisions continued
analogous to the English rule or the New York section and should not be con-
fused therewith upon a superficial examination.
62 In Isham v. Gilbert, 3 Conn. 166, 170 (1819), the court held that "If the
defendant is bound to make discovery, and of this there exists no doubt, chancery
will follow it up with relief. Although a court of equity, which has acquired
cognizance for the purpose of a discovery, will not, of course, grant relief; yet
it will do it, in most cases of fraud, account, accident, and trust" In Middle-
town Bank v. Russ, 3 Conn. 135 (1819), the court, at p. 140, asked "whether a
court of chancery, having taken jurisdiction for enforcing a discovery, will
universally assume cognizance of the cause, settle every question which may
arise, and grant ultimate relief. I have no hesitation in giving a negative to
this question. * * * On the contrary, the distinction is familiar between bills
technically denominated bills of discovery, in which the discovery is auxiliary to
a suit in a court of law, and bills of discovery and relief, in which the case is
terminated in chancery." And at p. 141, "It is a very unfounded conception,
that every resort to chancery, for the ascertainment of a fact, transfers the
jurisdiction over the cause from law to equity, when many, and perhaps most, of
the facts are disputed, and many questions of law remain open for decision. It
is true, that chancery, having acquired cognizance of a suit for the purpose of
a discovery, will entertain it for the purpose of relief, in most cases of fraud,
account, accident, and mistake. * * *"
63 2 RFv. STAT. 199, pt. III, c. 1, tit. 3, § 21 et seq. Section 22 permitted
the court to make general rules for cases in which discovery might be had "and
therein the court shall be gove.ned by the principles and practice of the court of
chancery in compelling discovery * * *." Section 23 outlined the procedure
which permitted an order (1) without notice to issue, or (2) to show cause.
Section 24 permitted vacatur of the order of discovery when (1) "it ought not
to have been granted," referring to the ex parte order of § 23; (2) "Upon the
discovery sought, being made"; and (3) where on motion it is denied that the
party has "possession or control" of the documents, etc. Section 25 permitted a
stay of all proceedings until the discovery order "shall have been complied with
or vacated." Section 26 penalized a recalcitrant party by dismissing or entering
judgment, "and the power of the court to compel such discovery shall be con-
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this power but have not enlarged upon it. Here and there
the procedure 'May be somewhat more clarified,64 but the
original principles remain.6 5  Under this grant of limited
jurisdiction "in the nature of a usurpation", 6 the New York
courts institutionalized the power and the procedure 67 to a
fined to the remedies herein provided, and shall not extend to authorise any
other proceedings against the person or property of the party so refusing or
neglecting." Section 27 set forth the effect of the documents, etc. so produced.
:4 N. Y. RULES OF CIV. PRAC. §§ 140 et seq.65 McQuigan v. D., L. & W. R. R., 129 N. Y. 50, 54, 29 N. E. 235, 236(1891) ("When we examine the history of the power of common-law courts to
compel the production and inspection of books and papers in possession of the
opposite party in a civil action, we find that originally the courts disclaimed any
power in the matter, and the remedy by bill of discovery was the only resource
of the party desiring such recovery. Finally, the common-law courts assumed a
limited equitable jurisdiction over the subject, and in addition to the rule that a
party pleading a deed should make profert of the instrument which enabled the
other party to demand oyer, the courts by order compelled a party who in his
pleading relied upon a written instrument, not a deed, to give inspection to the
other party, if required, and so in other special cases. The courts in this state,
prior to any statute, exercised a limited equitable jurisdiction of the same
character. [Lawrence v. Ocean Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 241, 245 (N. Y. 1814);
Denslow v. Fowler, 2 Cbw. 592 (N. Y. 1824).] But this limited jurisdiction
was exercised sparingly and with hesitation and it was not until statutes were
enacted in England and in this state, conferring upon common-law courts the
same power to compel the discovery and inspection of books and papers, which
was exercised by courts of chancery on bills of discovery, that courts of
common law claimed or exercised full power over the subject. [14 & 15 Vicr.
c. 99; 17 & 18 Vicr. c. 125; REv. STAT. 199, § 21.] The limited jurisdiction
exercised by these courts before the statute was in the nature of a usurpation,
and, so far as we can discover, it was never considered that they possessed an
inherent power in aid of justice to grant relief in cases outside of the narrow
limit mentioned. * *
66 Ibid.
67 Cardozo, Ch.J., in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N. Y. 24,
156 N. E. 84 (1927) has exhaustively traced the development of discovery and
inspection. His words are of sufficient importance to warrant extended quo-
tation, but space limitation forces reference thereto instead.
In Matter of Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 255, 53 N. E. 1103 (1899), the origin
of the Supreme Court is traced to the Statute of 1691, and this "Supreme Court
of the province was the instrument by which the great body of the jurisprudence
of the English common law was applied to New York. * * * The Revised Con-
stitution now in force continues the Supreme Court 'with general jurisdiction in
law and equity' * * *. Thus we have the powers of the Court of King's Bench
and the Court of Chancery as they existed when the first Constitution was
adopted, blended and continued in the Supreme Court of the state, except as
modified by Constitution or statute." The statements in King v. Leighton, 58
N. Y. 383 (1874) disclose that "The provisions of the Revised Statutes in
respect to the discovery of books and papers were introduced to remedy the
defects of power in common-law courts over that subject. Originally confined
to the Supreme Court, they were extended to certain other courts by chapter 38
of the Laws of 1841; but they neither conferred or controlled the power of the
Court of Chancery. That court acted by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction
over discovery and framed its own rules, fixed the limits within which it would
proceed and from time to time adjusted its proceedings to meet the requirements
of justice. * * * Prior to a decree, an order for the production of books and
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point where additional reforms seemingly were required,68
for "The tendency of our age", reported the Commissioners
in 1848, "is to look for the truth wherever it may be found." 69
The resulting Code of Procedure 70 provided:
"The court before which an action is pending, or
a judge or justice thereof, * * * in their discretion,
papers could only be made, according to the settled practice, upon the admission
of the defendant in his answer. * * * in all cases the admission of the party of
the fact of possession or control was the necessary foundation for an order
requiring production. * * *" Briefly, it thus appears that the equitable Chan-
cery Courts still retain their original inherent jurisdiction unimpaired by statutes
extending discovery powers to the law courts. Since in derogation of the
common law, these "law court" powers cannot be furthered save by additioial
legislative grants of power. While the "practicing" distinction between "law"
and "equity" has been abolished, still the "power" distinction remains and is
recognized in, for example, discovery and production of documents, etc. Since
the criminal law is likewise statutory, express grants must be found ere equitable
or law power is there assimilated into its procedure.
68 The l~v. STAT. § 21 had conferred discovery powers upon the Supreme
Court "but by the succeeding section it is declared that in the exercise of this
power the court shall be governed by the principles and practice of the court
of chancery, in compelling discovery. Under this restriction, it has been under-
stood that a party could only obtain a discovery of such papers and documents,
in the possession or control of his adversary, as might furnish evidence in his
own behalf upon the trial. Meekings agt. Cromwell, 1. Sand. S. C. Rep. 698.
In CoopaR's EQ. PL. 58, the rule in chancery is stated to be, that a plaintiff in a
bill of discovery 'shall only have discovery of what is necessary for his own
title, as of deeds he claims under, and not pry into that of the defendant'"
Powers v. Elmendorf, 4 How. Pr. 59, 60 (N. Y. 1849). See (1930) 44 H~Av.
L. RFv. 633f. ("When the reform of court procedure set in, practically every
state took steps to remedy the situation, sometimes simply by giving to the law
courts the same powers as were previously exercised by the chancellor, in other
instances by spelling out a statutory procedure, which has generally been judi-
cially restricted in its major features to the scope of the old equitable bill",
and cases cited thereunder). The First Report of the Commissioners on Prac-
tice and Pleadings, with a suggested Code of Proc. (Albany, 1848), at p. 244,
stated that "Before the act of the last session, whenever a party sought a dis-
covery from his adversary, he was obliged to file a bill in equity, called a bill of
discovery. The proceeding was dilatory and expensive. If the examination be
had at all, it may be had in the same action as well as in another. That it
should be had in some form, our law has always admitted. The difficulty was,
that the process to obtain it, was oppressive, and often ineffectual." The Com-
missioners therefore recommended that a section be adopted in the proposed
Code holding.that "Either party may require of the other, at any time, an
inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy, of a paper in his possession,
or under his control, containing evidence relating to the merits of the action, or
the defence therein. If it be refused, the court, on motion, may exclude the
paper from being given in evidence."
69 Id. at 246. The balance of the paragraph follows: "Let us not fear, thatjudges and juries will be deluded into a belief of an improbable or untrue story,
though the parties themselves be the persons who utter it."
70 Section 388, last two sentences. The Commissioner's Report, supra note
68, was changed somewhat, as a comparison will disclose. Section 389 of the
Code stated that "No action to obtain discovery under oath, in aid of the prose-
cution or defence of another action, shall be allowed, * * *."
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and upon due notice, (may) order either party to give
to the other, within a specified time, an inspection and
copy, or permission to take a copy, of any books, papers
and documents in his possession, or under his control,
containing evidence relating to the merits of the ac-
tion, or the defence therein. If compliance with the
order be refused, the court, on motion, may exclude
the paper from being given in evidence, or punish the
party refusing or both." 71
The new Code did not supersede the provisions of the
Revised Statutes but was auxiliary to them, furthering the
power to compel production by enlarging the permissible pun-
ishment.72  The experiences under these new sections 73 re-
71 In Powers v. Elmendorf, 4 How. Pr. 59 (N. Y. 1849), one of the first
applications under the newly-enacted Code was made. The court, at p. 61,
discussed the elimination of the 22nd section of the REv. STAT., supra note 63,
and believed that "From the absence of this restriction, it might be fairly
inferred that the legislature did not intend that the court should hereafter be
governed by the principles and practice of the court of chancery in compelling
the discovery." This opinion has not been followed and the doctrine of limited
jurisdiction still prevails. See notes 65 and 67, mpra.
72 Gould v. McCarty, 11 N. Y. 575 (1854). The Act of 1841 had given
to the superior court the same discovery powers the Supreme Court then held;
the Revised Statutes (note 63, supra) set forth a procedure to obtain discovery
although Section 22 permitted general rules to "prescribe the cases in which
the discovery may be compelled." Defendant's refusal to produce documents
after the procedure set forth in the Revised Statutes had been meticulously
obeyed resulted in the striking of his answer. His present appeal from the
judgment entered against him claimed that the Superior Court had no jurisdic-
tion because no general rules had been promulgated by the Supreme Court.
"That is true; but the omission to frame rules does not annul the inherent power
of the court to compel a discovery, or the power granted by the previous section;
the general rules were designed to regulate its exercise. (citations) Jurisdic-
tion does not depend upon the rule, but the rule is a consequence of the jurisdic-
tion. * * * The 388th section of the code is not a substitute for the provisions
of the revised statutes, but auxiliary to them. By the previous statute, the court
was restricted to the remedies there provided, where a discovery was refused by
a party against whom an order for that purpose had been granted; but, by the
code, power is given to exclude the document from being given in evidence, or
to punish the party refusing, or both." (Cf. dissent in Davis v. Dunham, 13
How. Pr. 425, 427 [N. Y. 1855], although bowing to the Court of Appeals'
ruling.)
In Hoyt v. Am. Exch. Bank, 8 How. Pr. 89 (N. Y. 1853), the appellate
court felt that "the two systems may stand together" and stated that "Applica-
tions to compel a discovery, or that an inspection and copy of books, papers and
documents be given, are becoming quite numerous. It is important that the
views which govern the action of the court in these proceedings should be
distinctly stated * * *." The court thereupon set forth numerous propositions
of law relating to discovery, production, and inspection. See also Brevoort v.
Warner, 8 How. Pr. 321, 325 (N. Y. 1853): "Upon whatever statute the power
to compel a discovery now rests, the same principles that governed its exercise
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sulted in the superior, albeit controversial,7 4 1876 enact-
ment i which, to overcome certain hardships, was subse-
quently amended.76 Statutory Revision Commissions there-
before, remain in .full force, and should prevail, except where there has been a
change by express legislation."
73 In Rice v. Ehele, 55 N. Y. 518, 523 (1874), an order had been made on
notice requiring defendants within 30 days to produce certain books and
declaring that "for a failure thereof" preclusion would result and the answer
stricken unless the defendants obtained their own show cause order seeking to
vacate or answer the first order. About two weeks after the 30-day period
plaintiffs procured an ex parte order striking the answer, etc. Defendant
appealed from a denial of its motion to set aside such latter order. The court
upheld its contention, stating that the Revised Statutes, Section 26, "empowers to
nonsuit the plaintiff, and to bar him of a defence, in case of his refusing or
neglecting to obey the order. The fair interpretation is, that the case of a
refusal or neglect to comply must first be shown to exist; that it cannot be
anticipated either by the order or the general rule of the court, and must be
shown as all other facts are shown to the court, when parties have appeared and
are litigating, i.e., upon notice. (citation) These provisions of the Revised
Statutes have not been repealed by the Code. (citations) This method of
obtaining a discovery of books was framed with care, as we have seen, and was
not meant to be changed by general rules adopted by the court. * * *" The
1875 Reports of the Commissioners (Albany, 1876), transmitted to the 99th
Legislature (commencing Jan. 4, 1876), set forth proposed Sections 803 to 809
(subsequently incorporated verbatim in the adopted Code) and, at page 527 of its
Report, in discussing the changes, said that the statutes then in force are
"consolidated, and subjected to such changes as are necessary, to point out
clearly each step in the proceedings, and to provide against some abuses, for
which the present practice affords room, as follows. The power to order the
discovery, etc., is extended to all courts of record, except justices' courts in
cities; a referee may be appointed to superintend the discovery or inspection,
and certify as tq compliance or non-compliance with the order, and his com-
pensation is provided for; the threat of future punishment, in the order directing
a discovery, etc., is to be omitted, being a mere brutum fuhnen. See 55
N. Y. 518."
74 REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGIsLATIvE CommITrEE (1919) 11: "This code
met with great opposition at the time it was proposed for enactment and the
objections to it have continued with varying vigor since that time." At p. 14ff.
the Report lists the several Revision Committees and their reports. Leonard S.
Saxe has written that "New York has always pioneered in law improvement,
although its advances heretofore have been sporadic. Its contributions include
the Revised Statutes of 1828-1830, on which statutes throughout the world were
based; the veritable judicial revolution of 1846-1850, introducing the electivejudiciary and code practice; the resurgence (although in some respects a retro-
gression) in civil procedure in 1876; the laborious and monumental consolida-
tion of the general statutes from 1889 to the consummation of the Consolidated
Laws of 1909; the Judicial reorganizations of 1894 and 1925; the influences of
Butler, Field, Throop, Fiero, Collin, Marshall, Rodenbeck and Root. * * *"
Saxe, The Renascence of Civil Practice in New York (1938) 7 FORDHAAr
L. REv. 45.
7 CODE OF CIV. PROc. c. 8, TIT. 6, art. 4, §§ 803 to 809. The original section
read: "A court of record * * * has power to compel a party to an action pending
therein, to produce and discover, or to give to the other party, an inspection and
copy, or permission to take a copy, of a book, document, or other paper, in his
possession or under his control, relating to the merits of the action, or of the
defense therein."
76 Under the original 1876 section the following general cases are illustrative
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of the court's application of the section to the facts: Board of Ed. v. King,
7 N. Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 64 (1885) approved discovery "of the assessment roll
and warrant held by defendant"; Hayden v. Van Cortlandt, 84 Hun 150, 32
N. Y. Supp. 503 (3d Dept. 1895), where approval to discover and inspect
"marks on a tree" would have been given but "plaintiff failed in his petition and
affidavits to establish a state of facts showing the necessity and propriety of the
order in question"; Kennedy v. Nichols, 33 Misc. 726, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1053
(1901), holding that defendant's premises were not a book, etc.; Auerbach v.
D., L. & W. R. R., 66 App. Div. 201, 203, 73 N. Y. Supp. 118 (4th Dept. 1901),
holding that Section 803 could not properly be enlarged by Rule 14 of the
General Rules of Practice, which authorized "discovery not only of documents,
but of 'article or property in his possession or under his control' * * *"; Pina
Maya-Sisal Co. v. Squire Mfg. Co., 55 Misc. 325, 105 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1907),
holding fibre-cleaning machines not a book, etc.; Wilson v. Collins, 57 Misc.
363, 109 N. Y. Supp. 660 (1908), holding a picture was not a book, etc. but
querying whether a signature would make it a document, and then, in 57 Misc.
365, 109 N. Y. Supp. 662 (1908), deciding that it did not; Mephis Trotting v.
Smathers, 114 App. Div. 376, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1st Dept. 1906), holding
that since "the original affidavit has been destroyed, and solely because of the
insufficiency of the papers in showing that a copy is still in existence, and the
fact that no motion was made for the inspection of such copy," the motion was
denied with leave to renew.
By N. Y. Laws of 1909, c. 173, effective Sept. 1, 1909, § 803 was amended
so as to include "or to make discovery of any article or property" after the
book, etc. clause. In Matter of Ehrich v. Root, 134 App. Div. 432, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 395 (1st Dept. 1909), the court stated that the amendment "was doubtless
intended to afford a remedy which subd. 3 of rule 14 of the General Rules of
Practice was designed to give." See Danahy v. Kellog, 70 Misc. 25, 126 N. Y.
Supp. 444 (1910) (the body of a deceased person was held not to be an "article
or property"); Dugan v. Am.. Transfer Co., 160 App. Div. 11, 145 N. Y. Supp.
31 (2d Dept. 1913) (the court stated that the "Plaintiff could have had a dis-
covery of these broken rope ends, by which the condition of the rope fibres and
the apparent causes of this break could have been brought out, and not left, as
at present, to mere speculation"); Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Culgin Pace
Contr. Co., 66 Misc. 157, 121 N. Y. Supp. 226 (1910) (Lehman, J., joined a
Per Curiam Appellate Term decision holding that "one of the purposes of the
section of the Code is to allow the appellant to obtain information as to the
true character of the instrument sued upon; and, if it appears from the instru-
ment that there is any defense, even technical, which the law recognizes, he
should be given the opportunity to plead such defense"); Corbet v. Union
Dime, 67 Misc. 175, 122 N. Y. Supp. 268 (1910) (the same court, by Seabury,
J., held that "we think no good, reason exists why the plaintiff should not be
permitted to make photographic copies of these drafts before trial * * * ") ;
Donoghue v. Callanan, 152 App. Div. 162, 136 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1st Dept.
1912) (it was held permissible to photograph a machine).; Clery v. Clark, 140
App. Div. 934 (1st Dept. 1910); Beyer v. Transit Dev. Co., 139 App. Div. 724
(2d Dept. 1910). By Laws of 1913, c. 86, § 803 was further amended to include
"or photograph" after "take a copy," and as so twice amended remained up to
the adoption of the 1921 Civ. PRAc. Acr. After such amendment of 1913 it was
held, in Falco v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 161 App. Div. 735, 146 N. Y. Supp.
1024 (2d Dept. 1914), that defendant's accident reports by employees were not
evidence and could not be obtained under § 803. The last version of Rule 14
of the General Rules, prior to 1921, stated in Subdivision 3 that "Either party
may be compelled to make discovery of any book, document, record, article, or
property * * *," thus incorporating the term "record" whereas § 803 stated
"paper".
The above summary makes applicable the words of Andrews, J., in Mc-
Quigan v. D., L. & W. R. R., 129 N. Y. 50, 55, 29 N. E. 235 (1891) that "the
doctrine that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to mould the proceedings to
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after recommended either retention 7 or amendment,78 the
agitation finally culminating in the 1921 New York Civil
Practice Act. The intermittent reports prior to the adoption
of the Act seemingly credit the promulgation of the present
Section 327 to the efforts of the New York County Lawyers'
Association. 79 This section does not appear to have been the
meet new conditions and exigencies, is true, but in a limited sense. They can-
not, under cover of procedure or to accomplish justice in a particular case,
invade recognized rights of person or property."
77 ANNUAL REP. OF THE COMMRS. OF STAT. REV. (1900), incorporating as
Sections 2130 to 2136 the Code Sections 803 to 809, without change. At p. 16
they reported that "we have tried to follow a middle course, retaining as far as
practicable settled provisions, even if they might possibly be improved in
form * * *"
78 REP. OF THE BOARD OF STAT. CONS. (1912), recommending a short prac-
tice act with rules of the court as additions.
79 A general survey of these Reports discloses that prior to such Associa-
tion's recommendations the English Rule 15 had been referred to, although not
suggested outright. The REPORT referred to in note 78, suepra, consisted of
"merely suggestions indicating the line along which the simplification should
proceed" (p. 7). The recommended changes in practice were for the purpose of
ridding "the practice of its technical character, to expedite the settlement of legal
controversies, and (5) to introduce modern business methods in the law * * *"(p. 83f.). The Board felt that "Every opportunity should be afforded consis-
tent with the substantive rights of the parties to obtain .promptly the facts
necessary for trial and to determine all preliminary questions" (p. 152). It
therefore set forth, as the basis for culling the proper enactments therefrom,
the ENGLISH PRACTICE RULES, particularly Order 31, Rules 12 (p. 154), 14(ibid.), 15 (p. 155), and Rule 19A(1) and (2) (at p. 155f.), together with
more from other jurisdictions. The same Board, reporting in 1915, in Vol. I,
set forth a recommended Civil Practice Act to take effect Sept. 1, 1916, provid-
ing by Sections 31 and 32 that "Suitable rules shall provide for the summary
disposition of all matters of procedure subsidiary to the actual controversy
between the parties" and that "The general motion to determine the preliminary
relief to which a party is entitled before trial shall be made mandatory as to all
such matters, including * * * discovery, interrogatories, inspection * * *." Notes
28 and 29, at p. 200 et seq., contain rule selections from other jurisdictions, and
at p. 200 the English Rule 15 again appears. The proposed Civil Practice Rules
contained Rule 224 giving the court Dower to grant an order "(3) for the dis-
closure, verified by affidavit, of anyv books, papers, photographs, -documents,
articles or property which are or have been in his possession or control relating
to any matter in question therein; (4) for the production, verified by affidavit,
of such books, papers or documents; (5) for the inspection of such books,
papers or documents and the making of copies or photographs thereof * * *."
The Board's notes 302 and 303 (at p. 328 et seq.) traced the growth of exami-
nations, interrogatories, discovery and production and inspection and, at p. 336,
felt that "a general rule has been drafted to cover them all which will simplify
the practice upon this subject." They therefore omitted "Code of Civil Proce-
dure, sections 803, 804, 805, 806, 807Pt." and many others, as "being sufficiently
provided for." Under date of May 1, 1917, a sub-committee of the Committee
on Practice and Procedure in the Supreme Court of the First Judicial Depart-
ment, recommended a "proposed Act (which) is based, in the first instance,
upon the Civil Practice Act proposed by the Board of Statutory Consolidation
* * *." N. Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Year Book, 1917, at 175. The proposed
Act consisted of fifty-six sections of which § 27 was, verbatim, the English
Rule 15 save that "solicitor" became "attorney". Whereas the present section
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subject of much discussion, but the ferment in which it was
born discloses the (continuing) need for a "substantial e~ten-
sion of the right to examine * * * books and documents pend-
ing trial." 80 The liberalizing tendency of that day, together
states that the penalty is that the party "shall not afterward be at liberty" etc.,
the English rule states "afterwards", with an "s", and the above proposed
section likewise stated "afterwards". The report of the Board to the Legisla-
ture resulted in a Joint Legislative Committee on the Simplification of Civil
Practice being set up and, in pamphlet form, it suggested a revised Code of
Civ. Proc. and Rules of Court "so that the committee might receive suggestions
and criticisms." (Number 1 of the 1917 proposals, at p. 9.) The suggested
Code Section 558 is, verbatim, the present Section 327 (save that the present
"afterward" is spelled "afterwards") and beneath the proposed section, in
brackets, the following notation appeared: "English Practice, order 31, rule 15,
applied only to an action. Short Practice Act proposed by County Lawyers'
Association, sec. 27." The Board then reported by a letter of transmittal dated
Feb. 1, 1919 (Vol. V of its report of 1919), setting forth a proposed Civ. Prac.
Act of forty-two sections and of Civ. Prac. Rules to number 316. Section 24
the proposed Act was, with but slight changes, verbatim, the proposed Rule 224
of its 1915 Report, supra; the Board's proposed Rules now contained Rule 167,
"Any person refusing without reasonable cause * * * to produce any book, paper
or document required * * * is liable to commitment. A disobedience to * * *
observe an order for * * * disclosure, production or inspection may be punished
by excluding as evidence a book, document or other paper the production, copies
or inspection whereof is refused or by directing judgment for contempt * * *."
The Joint Legislative Committee, supra, in a letter of transmittal dated April
17, 1919 (LEG. Doc. No. 111), suggested the adoption of present §§ 327 and 328,
stating "Each of the above sections is taken from the English practice. Both
have been approved by the bar and will facilitate practice" (p. 45). Its pro-
posed sections were numbered respectively 342 and 343. The writer has been
informed that the particular Committee and Sub-committee records at the New
York County Lawyers' Association are not available, having long since been
discarded, if ever in existence. Doubt is expressed that the Sub-committee
would have kept written committee reports and it has been impossible, at this
late date, to obtain information from the Committee secretary, now resident in
Chicago, or the other Committeemen who are either unavailable or have no
recollection of the matter.
80 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN
NEW YORK STATE (1934) 39. The language quoted, while not of the period
under discussion, is nevertheless apropos. The need today continues in much
the same fashion as was manifest in the legally troublous period between the
Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Practice Act. This REPORT, at 315
et seq., gives an excellent background of examination and discovery develop-
ment, but does not touch upon § 327 of the N. Y. Civ. PpAc. ACT. Its proposed
new statutes suggest a new § 289 which would include the following: "The
notice (of examination) may also require the production of a book, document
or other paper in the custody of any party or person to be examined, as to the
contents of which an examination or discovery and inspection is desired; and
on the examination such book, document or other paper, or any part or parts
thereof, which are relevant to the prosecution or defense of the action or pro-
ceeding as to which the examination is sought, may be offered in evidence
whether or not used by a witness to refresh his memory. The notice may also
require that a party to be examined produce and discover, or give an inspection
and copy, or permission to take a copy or photograph, of a book, document or
other paper or any part or parts thereof, or to make discovery of any article
or property in his possession or under his control, which are relevant to the
prosecution or defense of the action or proceeding." The "Comment" under
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with the express language of the Act,81 nevertheless influ-
enced and molded the courts' future attitude, that "The stat-
ute should be liberally construed. It is a powerful aid in the
search for truth." 82 Since its incorporation into the Act,
however, Section 327 has not often been construed . 3  The
courts have been forced to grope blindly for a procedure
whereby its mandates could be enforced, and the resulting
confusion has given anomalous results.
In the early case of Wile v. Nassau Snelting & Refining
Works, 4 defendant opposed a motion for a preference and in
its papers referred to certain documents, 8 5 which immediately
became the basis for plaintiff's notice to produce. At the
Special Term hearing of defendant's motion to vacate such
this proposed section is barren of any discussion whatsoever on the language
pertinent to this study.
Proposed § 291, "Motion to Vacate or Modify the Notice," requires, "Any
question as to the right!' so to examine or compel production and discovery,
etc. "may be raised by a motion to vacate or modify the notice." Proposed§ 299-a, "Additional Penalties for Disobedience by a Party," states that "the
court, in a proper case, may make an order * * * that the book, document or
other paper, or article or property required to be produced be excluded from
being given in evidence by him * * *"
81 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 2, "This Act shall be liberally construed"; § 3,
"The rule of the common law that a statute in derogation of the common law
is strictly construed does not apply to this act."
82 Lehman, Inc. v. Turtle Bros., 149 Misc. 744, 267 N. Y. Supp. 785 (1933),
the court's general attitude being approved in Reiss v. Kirkman & Son, 242
App. Div. 77, 273 N. Y. Supp. 7 (2d Dept. 1934).
83 Wile v. Nassau Smelting & Refining, 205 App. Div. 657, 200 N. Y. Supp.
154 (1st Dept. 1923) ; Pearl v. Brutstein, 208 App. Div. 788 (2d Dept. 1924) ;
Royal Bank v. Williams, 220 App. Div. 603, 222 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st Dept.
1927) ; Schmoll Fils v. Baltic America, 231 App. Div. 231, 247 N. Y. Supp. 305
(1st Dept. 1931); Burgin v. Ryan, 238 App. Div. 122, 263 N. Y. Supp. 242
(2d Dept. 1933); Siegel v. Mortgage Comm., N. Y. L. J., July 21, 1937; Lina
Pictures Corp. v. H. E. R. Lab., Inc., 254 App. Div. 723 (1st Dept. 1939);
Liggett v. Comprodaily Pub. Co., 256 App. Div. 1005 (2d Dept. 1939) ; Kiss v.
Kiss, 258 App. Div. 736, 817 (2d Dept. 1939) ; Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, N. Y. L. J.,
April 25, 1938; Still v. Moss, N. Y. L. J., June 7, 1939; Stanton v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 8, 1939; Corcoran v. Time, Inc., N. Y.
L. J., Mar. 20, 1940, p. 1266, col. 1.
84205 App. Div. 657, 200 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1st Dept. 1923). All future
quotations in this, and other cases, are from the respective Records or Papers
on Appeal unless otherwise noted.
85 At p. 658 the documents referred to seem to be "certain papers and letter
referred to in an affidavit of the defendant in a motion for a preference, which
papers and letters are the basis of complete defenses theretofore interposed, and
are referred to in the said affidavits as receipts in full and acknowledgments of
payment of salary for April 1. 1919 and all clains to date inclusive (sic). There
is also mention in the affidavits of defendant of letters evidencing abandonment
of the contract upon which the action is predicated, and besides this, one of the
affidavits alleges that defendant holds an acknowledgment signed by plaintiff of
payment of all claims due from this defendant. * * *"
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notice, it was held that "a party may no longer, by way of
pleading or affidavit, state that he possesses papers that are
harmful to his adversary, unless he is willing to lay his cards
upon the table and allow his adversary to copy those
papers." 86 Defendant's subsequent appeal found the Appel-
late Division affirming the lower court and, since no New
York precedents or procedure existed, referring to the Eng-
lish Rules and attempting to formulate a modus operandi
then lacking:
"While this provision is borrowed from rule 15
of order 31 of the English Rules of the .Supreme Court,
it falls short of those Rules in failing to provide for
an enforcement order such as is found therein. (See
Eng. Rules Sup. Ct., order 31, rule 18.) * * * The
penalty in our act's provision need not be enforced
until the trial, for no section to compel cdmpliance
with the notice to produce and exhibit theretofore is
enacted, nor is provision made for enforcement in ad-
vance of trial under the Rules of Civil Practice. The
section's enforcement is to be refused only when the
party shall satisfy the court that the document de-
manded in the notice relates to defendant's title or that
he had some other sufficient cause or excuse for non-
compliance with the notice.
"The better procedure of a party to obtain relief
from such a notice to produce and exhibit documents
which he deems improvident or contrary to the inter-
est of justice, or where he has good cause to show why
he ought not to be compelled to comply with the de-
mand of such a notice, is to apply to the court to have
it vacated, modified or regulated by a preliminary
order, thus assimilating the practice under this form
of notice to that used under the notice for examina-
tion before trial. (Citation.) If the party upon whom
such notice is served awaits the trial for relief from
s6 Ibid., record, folio 96. The Special Term Justice could have emasculated
this section at birth but his wise opinion held that "The statute is taken word
for word * ** from Rule 15 of Order 31 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
England. * ** The order should be granted (sic) unless good reason is shown
why it should not be granted. * * * As I see no reason here the plaintiff should
have the inspection he seeks (and) the motion to vacate will be denied."
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his failure to comply with the demand therein, he
risks the exclusion of conclusive evidentiary docu-
ments to the necessary summary revieiV of his asserted
grounds and immediate decision thereon for his failure
to comply with the notice which is perforce incident
to an examination of a collateral issue at a trial.
"His failure to apply for relief by motion to va-
cate will properly be urged as a ground to refuse to
give either credence or weight to reasons for the al-
lowance of the introduction of the involved documents
in evidence, and the surprise of his adversary will
often necessitate postponements and adjournments to
reach a just conclusion of a wholly collateral matter.
This ought to be avoided. In cases in which excep-
tional circumstances are shown, the court may allow
this practice, but obviously it must be a rare instance
when it ought to be followed. * * *
"* * * there is no limit to the right to give the
notice and no restriction on the kinds of papers which
must be produced, except as recited in the sec-
tion, * *
"The fixing in this order of a time to exhibit the
papers demanded is, necessarily, within the implied
power of the court in making its order on a motion
made by defendant to vacate, although no express
grant of power to make this direction is given in the
act * * * 87
This excellently reasoned opinion settled all doubts for
a period of eight years,88 until the case of Shmoll Fils v.
87 Id. at 658ff.
88 Three other cases had meanwhile been decided but are not important in
the formulation of the section's theory and practice. In Pearl v. Brutstein, 208
App. Div. 788 (2d Dept. 1924), the entire record was, "Order denying inspection
of the contract reversed on the law * * * and motion granted. * * * See N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. ACT § 327. No opinion." The record on appeal discloses plaintiff
suing on a written agreement annexed to the complaint and allegedly signed by
the defendant. Before answering defendant served a notice under § 327, which
was ignored, and then moved to compel production and inspection. On the
denial of this motion defendant appealed. Plaintiff-respondent's third "Point"
on the appeal was that "The defendant has a complete remedy under § 327 for
failure to exhibit the document pursuant to that section, and having selected
that remedy he should be precluded from pursuing another." The English rule
is set forth in note 53, srapra, in the Quilter case. In Dixie Drinking Cup v.
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Baltic America brought Section 327 into apparent conflict
with its companion-adopted Section 328.89 Pursuant to the
provisions of fhis latter section, plaintiff obtained an affi-
davit of documents and then immediately served a notice
under Section 327. Defendant's motion to vacate was denied
and the Appellate Term affirmed with leave to appeal. The
appellant's brief, which traced the historical development of
Sections 324, 327 and 328, showed the legal difficulties exist-
ing under the old General Rules of Practice,9 ° and concluded
Paper Utilities Co., 5 F. (2d) 322 (E. D. N. Y. 1925), defendant moved before
answer "for an order directing plaintiff * * * to file a verified statement of
certain exhibits alleged by defendants to be now in its possession or control, or
if not in its possession or control, to state what has become of such exhibits,
and whether or not such exhibits are in substantially the same condition * * *
(and) that all of the said exhibits * * * be offered for inspection by defendants
and their counsel, with the right to photograph or copy same * * *." It was
held that regardless of Sections 324, 327 and 328 of the State Practice Act, the
federal procedure was regulated by the equity rules which required interroga-
tories and admissions. In Royal Bank v. Williams, 220 App. Div. 603, 222
N. Y. Supp. 475 (1st Dept. 1927), while discussing defendant's appeal from an
order striking his denials of "any knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the" plaintiff's allegations concerning three pleaded and annexed
written agreements, the court stated that it did not "avail the defendant to urge
that the documents are several years old and hence that he has forgotten whether
he had signed them or not. Under the circumstances his duty is to know the
facts where they are at hand and accessible. Among the beneficent provisions
of the Civil Practice Act is one affording this remedy, N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT
§ 327, which was wisely taken over * * * even if at a late date." This last case
is peculiarly like the Pearl case, supra, and both Appellate Courts, the Second
and First Departments deciding them respectively, reached the same conclusion.
89 While § 328 has not been discussed save incidentally, its adoption and
recommendation was in the manner set forth for § 327. This section permits
an order to be made requiring a verified statement "whether any one or more
specific documents, to be specified in the application, is or are, or has or have
at any time been in his possession or power, and if not then in his possession,
when he parted with the same, and what has become thereof."
90'The N. Y. CODE OF CIv. PROC. provided, by § 803, a method to obtain
discovery and inspection. This was supplemented by General Rules XIV to
XVI, particularly Rule XV requiring a showing of "materiality and necessity
* * *, the particular information" required, "and in the case of books and
papers, that there are entries therein as to the matter, of which he seeks a
discovery or inspection." This rule made it practically impossible to obtain a
discovery and inspection for the moving party had to prove too many facts in
the other's possession. Bell v. Gelbert Paper Co., 117 Misc. 610, 613, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 26 (1922), aff'd, 201 App. Div. 867 (3d Dept. 1922). In Vadervel v.
Prudential Ins. Co., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 9, 1937, the court's opinion was: "Plaintiff
moves pursuant to the provisions of § 328 of the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act. to
compel defendant to state by affidavit whether a specific document is in its
possession and upon the basis of the information sought presumably intends to
apply for a discovery of such document under the provisions of § 324 of the
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act. The document referred to is an affidavit regarding a
premium due notice, served pursuant to § 92 of the Insurance Law. It is not a
document relating to the merits of the action within the purview of § 324 of the
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act. It is evidentiary matter, information as to which was
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that two liberalizing changes were sought by the adoption of
the Civil Practice Act, namely, elimination of the old Rule
XV in place of the new Section 328, so that a party might
now obtain information upon which he could move for a dis-
covery and inspection under Section 324 (old 803), and the
creation of "a wholly new procedure, whereby an inspection
could be obtained simply by the service of a notice, without
any order of the court." 91 The Appellate Division accepted
in its entirety this line of reasoning and the construction of
327 advanced, 92 saying:
"Where a defendant has referred to and thus re-
lied- upon documents in his pleadings and affidavits,
his adversary thereby has a right to a discovery and
inspection of these documents. Because the party has
so referred to and relied upon them, his rights cannot
be infringed by an inspection of these documents by
his adversary. Having referred to the documents in
his pleadings or affidavits, he can reasonably be re-
quired to afford a discovery and inspection, since this
is no more than if he had set forth the documents at
length in his pleadings or affidavits. Where, however,
a party is given a right to compel his adversary to
state whether documents which have not been referred
to by such adversary are or ever have been in his pos-
session, as to these documents the rights of the adver-
sary must still be safeguarded by requiring an applica-
previously denied plaintiff by order of the Appellate Division. [247 App. Div.
883 (1st Dept. 1936), reargument denied, 248 App. Div. 577 (1st Dept. 1936).]
To grant this motion would be futile inasmuch as an application under § 324
of the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act would be refused. Motion denied."
91 Schmoll Fils v. Baltic America, 231 App. Div. 231, 247 N. Y. Supp. 305
(1st Dept. 1931), appellant's brief on appeal to Appellate Division, p. 3. At
page 232 of the official report, the court posed the question in the appeal and
decided that the notice was unauthorized.
92 At p. 7 of appellant's brief the following argument is advanced: "It is to
be noted that the requirements of § 327 have nothing to do with those of § 324,
and have nothing in common with the provisions of § 328. It is utterly imma-
terial, so far as § 327 is concerned, whether or not the documents in question
are in the possession of the adverse party; nor is it necessary that they be
material to the issues in the action. The sole and single requisite for the appli-
cation of § 327 is that the document or documents in question have been relied
on in a pleading or affidavit. If they have, a notice under § 327 is authorized.
If they have not, it is not. So far as § 327 is concerned, it does not make a
particle of difference whether or not the documents are in the possession of the
adverse party, nor even whether they relate to the issues in the action."
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tion to the court, rather than compelling him to submit
these documents to the opposite -party upon a mere
notice furnished by that party.
"In order also to show that the documents re-
ferred to in section 328 are not these required to be
produced by a mere notice under section 327, it is suf-
ficient to note that under section 327 it is not necessary
for the documents to be even in the p6ssession of the
adverse party. The mere fact that he has relied upon
them in his affidavits or pleadings casts upon him the
burden to discover and produce them to his adversary
for' inspection.
"It follows that under the liberalizing provisions
of the Civil Practice Act a party may compel a dis-
covery and inspection of documents referred to in
pleadings and affidavits by an adversary by the giving
of a mere notice, but cannot obtain a discovery and
inspection of documents not referred to, even though
he may compel his opponent to state by affidavit that
they are in his possession, unless he applies for and
obtains a court order requiring such discovery and
inspection."
The inferences to be drawn from these two decisions ap-
parently have been sufficient to repel additional attacks upon
the basic structure of the section. Subsequent primary and
appeal questions related to the time and place to obtain pre-
clusion upon a refusal to produce; 93 whether an examination
before trial was within the purview of the term affidavit; 94
whether a sworn statement that the documents have been
93 Burgin v. Ryan, 238 App. Div. 122, 123, 263 N. Y. Supp. 242, 243 (2d
Dept. 1933) : "* * * The practice in respect to such order of preclusion is
unsettled as to whether the application should be made at Special Term or on
the trial. We think the matter rests largely in discretion. In this case it would
appear that the defendant was entirely captious in his refusal. He had set up
a part of it in his answer, and in his motion papers had claimed that there had
been a vital addition made to it without his consent or authority, which he says
was made either by mutual mistake or misrepresentation on the part of the
plaintiff. It was important that the paper be exhibited. The failure to comply
with the notice casts grave doubt on defendant's good faith."
94 Liggett v. Comprodaily Pub. Co., 256 App. Div. 1005 (2d Dept. 1939).
The briefs on appeal disclose this question was argued and therefore necessarily
decided in the affirmative, although the opinion makes no mention of such fact.
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destroyed is sufficient to justify non-production; 95 whether
the denial of a bill of particulars, setting forth at length a
pleaded contract, was res adjudicata. upon the question of a
subsequent notice under Section 327; 91 and how preclusion
might be avoided where the document is subsequently found.9 7
Two slight references 9  and four additional cases 9 9 com-
prise the sum total of New York adjudications upon the sec-
tion. In Jeffrey v. Jeffrey,10 0 defendant-wife moved for
counsel fees and, in opposition thereto, plaintiff stated he
had affidavits, reports, statements and photographs which
95 Ibid. The opinion holds such sworn statement to be sufficient, declaring
"* * It is obvious that appellants have bound themselves to the statement that
the original manuscript, clipping, etc., which form the basis of the alleged
libelous publications, have been destroyed and that appellants rely on the news-
paper articles stated in the bill of particulars, copies of which newspapers have
concedely been given to plaintiff's counsel. Appellants are required to make a
more thorough effort to comply with item 3 of the notice and if unable to
comply therewith in whole or in part they should so certify under oath."
96 The Special Term held it was not res adjudicata, declaring that "*** *
The bill of particulars is part of the pleading by amplification, and while it may
be that plaintiff should not be charged with the entire contract as an amplifica-
tion of the pleading, the refusal of the court to grant relief sought by further
bill does not preclude an application under § 327 C. P. A. Defendant is entitled
to inspect the contract as a whole and not be compelled to rely on plaintiff's
excerpt thereof. Motion is granted unless * * * such contract be produced for
discovery and inspection." This decision was not appealed.
97 Burgin v. Ryan, 238 App. Div. 122, 123, 263 N. Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dept.
1933) (" **p* with leave to defendant to comply with the notice within three
days and to apply at Trial Term for leave to be allowed to put the same in
evidence upon such terms as may be then imposed") ; Still v. Moss, N. Y. L. J.,
June 7, 1939 (holding that the "Motion to preclude plaintiff, as provided in
§ 327 of the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, for failure to comply with notice for dis-
covery and inspection of check is denied upon condition that within five days
* ** plaintiff file her affidavit averring the check referred to in paragraph 2 of
her bill of particulars is lost and not in her possession or under her control,
together with the facts. Defendant may thereupon inspect and discover the
stub of the check book. If before the trial the check is found, plaintiff may
move as advised to offer same in evidence. Benzin (sic) v. Ryan, 238 App. Div.
122, 263 N. Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dept. 1933). If condition herein is not complied
with, motion is granted ** *" Obviously no motion to preclude is "provided
(for) in § 327, C. P. A.").
08 Keeley v. Assoc. G. & E. Co., 155 Misc. 146, 148, 278 N. Y. Supp. 962(1935) (This case is unimportant, merely referring to the accomplished fact of
production having already occurred pursuant to § 327) ; Siegel v. Mort. Comm.,
N. Y. L. J., July 21, 1937 ("Defendants in their answer make certain allegations
and allege that they have documentary evidence to sustain them. Plaintiff
served a notice under N. Y. Civ. PR~c. Acr § 327 for inspection of the docu-
ments. It seems to this court that such section provides that wherever a docu-
ment is pleaded by the tenor the adversary can view the document. Whether
the document was necessarily pleaded at all seems irrelevant. The motion to
vacate the notice is denied").
99 Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, Stanton v. City Bank, Kiss v. Kiss, and Corcoran v.
Time, Inc., note 83, supra.110 See note 83, supra.
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allegedly disclosed defendant's adultery. A notice was subse-
quently served and plaintiff moved to vacate, alleging the
statements and reports were oral, but the motion was denied,
the court stating that "If they are not documents or writings
obviously production cannot be required." In Stanton v.
City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,1° 1 plaintiff had previously
moved for discovery and production of certain books and
records, which motion was denied. Thereafter a notice to
produce was served and defendant moved to vacate, alleging
the previous denial "and on the further ground that the books
and records described are not such as are provided for in
section 327." 102 Not discussing the first objection, the court
granted vacatur, saying:
"* * * it is quite evident that section 327 does not
cover an inspection of minute books, cash books, stock-
books, journals, ledgers and books of account as de-
scribed in the notice. Such books cannot be regarded
as 'documents' which are defined as 'writings; words
printed, lithographed or photographed; seals, plates,
or stones on which inscriptions are cut or engraved;
photographs and pictures; maps and plans.' (Cita-
tion.) Moreover, to entitle a party to an inspection
of the documents under section 327 it must appear that
such documents are referred to in the pleadings of the
opposing party. An examination of the defendants'
answer here discloses no such reference. To permit
indiscriminate inspections of books without court di-
rection or safeguards would lead to so many manifest
abuses that it should never be countenanced or en-
couraged."
In Kiss v. Kiss,103 defendant-wife applied for temporary
alimony and counsel fees. In opposition, plaintiff submitted
the affidavit of an individual "who states that he is a radio
and sound recording operator" and who "recorded conversa-
tions that were had and other sounds which were produced"
which proved defendant's adultery. Defendant thereafter
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. The facts are garnered from the papers on appeal.
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moved for an order of discovery and inspection of the records
under Section 324 which was granted at Special Term but
thereafter reversed by the Appellate Division because "It was
an improper exercise of discretion ** * 104 While this ap-
peal was pending defendant served a notice to produce under
Section 327, which notice was based upon the identical affi-
davits setting forth the records, etc., which had been the
subject of the discovery motion under Section 324. Plaintiff
moved to vacate, which motion was granted. The Appellate
Division then decided the first appeal on the ground of "an
improper exercise of discretion", and defendant moved to
re-argue the vacatur of the notice under Section 327, claim-
ing production as a matter of right, not discretion, and fur-
ther claiming the records were "documents". Plaintiff met
these issues squarely, likewise claiming that the original dis-
cretionary denial precluded a subsequent notice as a right.
The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion, 10 5 so that
its reasoning, as well as the exact legal question or questions
decided, is unknown.
In Cocoran v. Time, Inc, 1 0 a plaintiff sued to recover
damages based upon defendant's alleged misappropriation of
his prospectus and dummy for defendant. He claimed to
have conceived the idea upon which defendant's magazine
was based. After service of the complaint but before service
of the answer, defendant orally requested inspection of the
prospectus, the dummy, and certain statistics, all referred to
in the complaint. Plaintiff acquiesced to this and defen-
dant's time to answer was extended until after the produc-
tion. Plaintiff thereafter refused to produce and defendant,
by order to show cause under Section 324, moved for a dis-
covery and inspection. This motion was denied, "with leave
to renew after joinder of issued." Defendant filed its answer
and then served a notice under Section 327, which plaintiff
moved to vacate, and again moved for discovery and inspec-
tion under Section 324. Both motions were argued simul-
taneously and the court, in denying the motion to vacate,
said:
104 258 App. Div. 736, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 835 (2d Dept. 1939).
105 258 App. Div. 817 (2d Dept. 1939).
1oa See note 83, supra.
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" * * * The notice under Section 327, C. P. A., may be
served 'at any time' either before or after joinder of
issue and the failure to comply is specifically limited
to a preclusion on the trial of the action, but in view
of the fact that an inspection and discovery has been
ordered under Section 324 and Rule 140, the necessity
for the relief sought under Section 327, 0. P. A., is
not apparent. The motion to vacate the notice is
granted, but without prejudice and without passing
upon the merits." 1o5b
III.
From this brief study of the applicable English and New
York decisions, can any general rules of procedure be formu-
lated,10  based upon authority 107 and logically deducible
corollaries? The English experience is definitely assimilable
into our practice 108 so that theoretical, as well as legal, guide-
bosb These decisions appeared after the writing, but before publication, of
the present article. The author has examined the filed papers and discussed the
case with defendant's attorney. From the previous discussion of the English
cases (note 53, supra) it would appear that the first decision in the Corcoran
case, that production pursuant to Section 327 would not be permitted until after
joinder of issue, is incorrect. This is the view of the Justice who decided the
subsequent two motions, for he distinctly holds that the notice "may be served
'at any time' either before or after joinder of issue * * *." This decision like-
wise jibes with the opinion heretofore given, that "it is submitted that the
raison d'etre of the English procedure is best served where the sole penalty for
non-production, by notice or order, is that set forth in Rule 15, for it is again
distinctly held that "the failure to comply is specifically limited to a preclusion
on the trial of the action * * *." This appears to be the reason why, given the
alternative of production under Section 327 or 324; the court chose the latter
(although carefully stating that the former was denied "without prejudice and
without passing upon the merits," since an appeal might reverse the production
ordered under Section 324 and leave defendant without the other remedy).
106 In Hunter v. D., W. & W. Ry., [1891], Ireland, 28 L. R. 489, 495,
FitzGibbon, L.J., discussed the rules involved and stated that the old "practice
is contrary to the system established by the existing Rules, and is therefore for
our purpose, to be regarded as obsolete."
107 Compare, however, the statement by Jessel, M.R., in Quilter v. Heatly,
[1883] 23 Ch. Div. 42, 49, that, "Speaking for myself I do not pay much atten-
tion to the dicta of modern judges, as I consider it my duty to decide for
myself. This, of course, does not apply to decisions of modern Judges, nor to
old recognized dicta by eminent Judges."
108 Wile v. Nassau Smelting Co., 205 App. Div. 657, 660, 200 N. Y. Supp.
154 (1st Dept. 1923), "The provision of the English Rules * * * from which
Section 327 *** is derived, and the citations of court rulings under the practice
in England, * * * are persuasive * * *." In Schechtman v. Salaway, 204 App.
Div. 549, 551, discussing § 213, it was said that "Sections in our Civil Practice
Act not theretofore contained in the Code of Civil Procedure and which find
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posts taken therefrom are of inestimable value in charting
the past and future of Section 327.
Order xxxi of the English Rules sets forth a complete
scheme for discovery and inspection of all documents on
either side save those legally privileged or inadmissible.
Under Rule 12 an affidavit of documents can be compelled,
which affidavit discloses "the documents which are or have
been in" the other party's "possession or power".10 9 This
affidavit is generally conclusive when the question of produc-
tion is considered, unless a further affidavit is required by
virtue of the court's inherent power or under Rule 19A (3) .no
Rule 14 grants power "to order the production * * * of such
of the documents in his possession or power * * * as the court
or judge shall think right." Since discovery is obtained
their source in the English Practice Rules or in the Rules of the Supreme
Court of England, may properly be construed and applied as in the English
cases. (See Applebaum v. Gross, 117 Misc. 140; aff'd, on opinion below, 200
App. Div. 914.)" See also Banca Nazionale Di Credito v. Equitable Co., 221
App. Div. 555, 557, 224 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dept. 1927) (construing § 323) ;
Rosenthal v. Magazine Repeating Co., 231 App. Div. 79, 246 N. Y. Supp. -
(1st Dept. 1930) (construing § 328).
109 Rule 13 refers to "The affidavit to be made by any person against whom
an order for discovery of documents has been made under Rule 12 * * *" and
directs that it shall be in the form as suggested in Appendix B, Form No. 8.
This form is entitled "Affidavit as to Documents." The affidavit of documents
heretofore referred to is the affidavit mentioned in Rules 12 and 13.
110 As to the inherent power of granting, and the manner of obtaining, such
further affidavit, and the grounds therefor, see 11 HALSButny's LAWS § 104f.,
p. 6 1f., where the editor's view is, that a further affidavit has no reference to
any other rule but, in § 106 of his discussion, Rule 19A(3) is referred to as the
basis for a further affidavit, "Where the party seeking discovery can swear
that, in his belief, the opposite party has or has at some time had in his posses-
sion or power a specified document or documents relating to any matter in
question between them * * *." It is further stated that "No order can be made
unless the applicant can name and specify certain specific documents, and the
order must be confined to those particular documents. * * *" In Reddaway &
Co. v. Hartley, [1928] WMKLY NoTEs, p. 189, the court granted a further
affidavit under this rule, and in Astra-National Prod., Ltd. v. Neo-Art., id. at
218, the court declared the rule "gave power to the Court to order discovery of a
particular document or class of documents where a prina facie case was made
out that the original affidavit of documents of the party against whom the
application was made was insufficient."
Rule 19A(3) declares that "The Court or a Judge may, on the application
of any party to a cause or matter at any time, and whether an affidavit of docu-
ments shall or shall not have already been ordered or made, make an order
requiring any other party to state by affidavit whether any particular document
or documents or any class or classes of documents specified or indicated in the
application, is or are, or has or have at any time been, in his possession, custody,
or power when he parted with the same and, what has become thereof. * * *"
This section allegedly forms the basis for our § 328 of the N. Y. CiV. PRAC.
AcT. See Rosenthal v. Magazine Repeating Razor Co., 231 App. Div. 79, 83,
246 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dept. 1930).
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through interrogatories "I or affidavits, production of those
documents "the court or judge shall think right" must now
be considered. Under Rule 15 production is obtainable on
notice, and such production is of two classes of documents,
those mentioned in pleadings, and those mentioned in affi-
davits. Under Rule 17 the other party must give inspection
within two days if the documents are referred to in "such
affidavit as is mentioned in rule 13", or if otherwise referred
to, then within four days. Where production is refused, an
order can be applied for under Rule 18 (1) and all applica-
tions must be based upon an affidavit, except where docu-
ments are "referred to in the pleadings, particulars, or affi-
davits of the party against whom the application is made,
or disclosed in his affidavit of documents." 112
This analysis lends added weight to the view previously
taken, that an affidavit of documents is within the purview
of Rule 15.113 The rule enunciated in Schmoll Fils v. Baltic
America 114 is, therefore, a misconception of the place Rule
19A(3) (which is the basis for our Section 328) has in Order
xxxi. Assimilating the English procedure under our Sec-
tions 327 and 328 would imply a reversal of this decision, but
a most important resulting corollary would require complete
adoption of the English scheme of production in Order xxxi.
This is manifestly a present institutional impossibility and,
111 First few rules of Order xxxi. They are not considered here although
likewise forming the basis for a future production order.
112 Rule 18(2).
113 See notes 34 and 38, supra. See also 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS 69: "An
order is usually first obtained for an affidavit of documents, and on the affidavit
being filed notice is given to produce the documents referred to in it or in any
pleading or any other affidavit of the party against whom inspection is sought."
See also Hunter v. D., W. & W. Ry., [1891], Ireland, 28 L. R. 489, 495, "I can
find no ground for limiting 'affidavits' in that Rule to any one class of affidavits.
If a party has referred to a document in any affidavit, and has thereby discov-
ered its existence, and relied upon it, he thereby leaves himself open to have
production of it ordered, unless he can prove special cause to the contrary."
114 231 App. Div. 231, 247 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1st Dept. 1931). The court
there held that §§ 327 and 328, C. P. A., are not related and that a notice under
§ 327, based upon an affidavit obtained under § 328, would be vacated. At p.
234 it stated that "The above conforms to the practice under the English Rules
of the Supreme Court. In England the right to require a discovery and inspec-
tion of documents by the giving of a notice by the adversary, has consistently
been construed to apply to documents upon which a party has relied in his
pleadings or affidavits * * *." This is incorrect in that such ruling does not




because of the theory already engrafted onto Sections 327
and 328, the subsequent legal accretions have tended to for-
mulate a separate New York scheme which has distinctive
legal possibilities. The English procedure in this respect is,
therefore, not pertinent here, and our two sections (327 and
328) are not to be confused in practice. Where an affidavit
of documents under Section 328 is obtained, production can
thereafter be had only pursuant to Section 324 which re-
quires an order after motion upon notice. 115
The production obtainable under Section 327 is of "docu-
ments" and, as has been disclosed, the English scheme en-
visages no such practice dichotomy as New York has adopted.
The language of (and construction placed upon) Section 324,
that production can be ordered of "a book, document, or other
paper, or * * * of any article or property", is the definition
placed upon the English "document", for they hold that
"There is a document wherever there is writing or printing
capable of being read, no matter what the material may be
upon which it is impressed or inscribed." 116 The decisions
in Stanton v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co."' and Kiss v.
Kiss 11 are therefore in direct conflict with the English
practice. The Stanton opinion is incorrect in two respects,
first in holding that books and records are not within the
term "document",11 9 and second in stating that "It must ap-
115 The procedure is set forth in tit. 18, rules 140ff. of the RULES OF CiV.
PRac. The motion is brought on by order to show cause and granted only when
certain facts are shown.
116 R. v. Daye, [1908] 2 K. B. 333. See note 39, sapra, for an extended
discussion of the English definition of this term.
117 See note 83, szpra.
118 258 App. Div. 817 (2d Dept. 1939). The papers on appeal contain the
facts omitted from the official report.
119 See note 39, supra; Arnold v. Pawtuxet Valley Water Co., 21 R. 1. 15
(1893) ; see also decisions under N. Y. Civ. PP.Ac. AcT § 324 holding that cor-
porate books and records are embraced by it. Of course this section contains
additional terms but this is not an argument against including corporate records
within the scope of "documents". The Stanton case is not understandable in
this respect: the decision sets forth an elaborate definition of "documents",
embracing a multiplicity of objects and then, based upon this extremely broad
definition, holds the corporate records are not a part of the "documents" so
defined. See BEsT's LAW OF EVmENCE (3d ed. 1908), annotations by Chamber-
layne, at p. 198, § 215, holding that "The remaining instruments of evidence
are DocuMENTs under which term are properly included all material substances
on which the thoughts of men are represented by writing, or any other species
of conventional mark or symbol. Thus the wooden scores on which bakers,
milkmen, etc. indicate, by notches, the number of loaves of bread or quarts of
milk supplied to their customers; the old exchequer tallies, and such like, * * *
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pear that such documents are referred to in the pleadings of
the opposing party." 120 The Kiss decision, if holding that
records are not "documents", is likewise incorrect, but the
case history discloses that production was refused because of
other grounds."' The geieral view of the New York courts
has been to delimit the construction placed upon "documents"
and to decide each case upon its own facts. This appears
to be sound, especially when the court's discretion is invoked
at all times,' but it is urged that extreme liberality in this
are documents as much as the most elaborate deeds." At p. 213 Chamberlayne's
notes state that "Within these definitions, a ring or banner with an inscription,
a musical composition, and a savage tattooed with words intelligible to himself,
would all be documents* **" The CENTURY DICTIONARY (1911), Vol. III,
at p. 1715, defines document as follows: "Strictly, a written or printed paper
containing an authoritative record or statement of any kind; more generally,
any writing or publication that may be used as a source of evidence or informa-
tion upon a particular subject or class of subjects; specifically, in the law of
evidence, anything bearing a legible or significant inscription or legend; any-
thing that may be read as communicating an idea (including thus a tombstone,
a seal, a coin, a sign-board, etc., as well as paper writings)."
120 Undoubtedly this is not intended by the court as a limiting statement,
but is so incorporated because of the arguments probably raised.
121 Supra, p. 9f., and compare reasons set forth in notes 46, 50, and 51,
supra. It would thus appear that the claim of "some other cause or excuse
which the court shall deem sufficient", N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 327, was upheld
in this case, although the decision is barren of reason. In Jeffrey v. Jeffrey,
supra note 83, the court granted production of photographs, etc. in a similar
situation. In Bishop v. Bishop, [1909] 43 I. L. T. 38, 55 and Beamish v. Beam-
ish, [1914], IrelInd, 49 I. L. T. 64, the plaintiff-husbands sued for divorce and
both had original letters and copies of letters which had passed between the
defendant and the person or person with whom she, defendant in each case, had
committed adultery. Both plaintiffs, in their affidavits of discovery, claimed
privilege. Held, in each case, that discovery would not be ordered.
122 In Wile v. Nassau Smelting & Refining Works, 205 App. Div. 657, 659,
200 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1st Dept. 1923), the court stated that "The section's
enforcement is to be refused only when the party shall satisfy the court that
the document demanded in the notice relates to defendant's title or that he had
some other sufficient cause or excuse for non-compliance with the notice." In
Schmoll Fils v. Baltic America, 231 App. Div. 231, 233, 247 N. Y. Supp. 305(1st Dept. 1931), the court held that "it is not necessary for the documents to
be even in the possession of the adverse party. The mere fact that he has relied
upon them * * * casts upon him the burden to discover and produce them * * *"
The attitude of counsel in subsequent appeals has been that a new right has
been created, automatic inspection upon notice. This is not the English experi-
ence. Since all court applications are granted "as the court or judge shall
think right" (Rule 14) and production is dependent upon whether or not "some
other cause or excuse which the court or 'judge shall deem sufficient for not
complying with such notice" (Rule 15) has been interposed, and since "the
order shall not be made When and so far as the court or a judge shall be of
opinion that it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter
or for saving costs" (Rule 18[11 and [2]), the wide discretion so granted
enables the court to exercise its independent judgment in practically every case.
11 HALSBURY's LAWS 69, states that "Where the party to whom the notice
is given refuses to produce the documents for inspection on the ground of
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respect be shown.
Reference to, or incorporation of, a document in a plead-
ing or affidavit casts upon 'a party "the burden to discover
and produce" 123 the same. The sine quo, non of this attitude
seems to be "reliance", in that the court queries "Why should
they not now let him see the evidence on which they relied
in support of that contention?" 124 This would logically
necessitate, however, a preliminary inquiry as to whether
"reliance" had been placed upon such documents to obtain
or deny relief, and thereafter the ordering of production.
But if such qualifications are read into the section it becomes
topheavy and cracks. There is a definite legal presumption
available, that the mere incorporation of, or reference to,
such document is ipso facto "reliance", 125 and placing the
onus for justifying the refusal of production upon such party
is an acceptance of this legal presumption. The New York
courts thus refuse to inquire into the question of "reli-
privilege where none exists, an application may be made to a master to compel
the production. The master's power to grant the order is limited in that he can
only allow it, if at all, so far as he considers it necessary either for disposing
fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. The matter is one for his
discretion subject to this (citations), and he may even refuse inspection of
material and unprivileged documzents." (Italics ours.)
123 Schmoll Fils v. Baltic America, 231 App. Div. 231, 233, 247 N. Y.
Supp. 303 (1st Dept. 1931). This burden to discover and produce attaches
immediately, in so far as respects documents, etc. set forth or referred to in
the pleading or, where a bill has been ordered prior to answer, in such bill as
well. See note 88, supra, where inspection was approved before answer in
Pearl v. Brutstein and Royal Bank v. Williams, thus following the Quilter v.
Heatly case, though not referring to it.
124 Hunter v. D., W. & W. Ry., [1891], Ireland, 28 L. R. 489, 495. The
pertinent quotation in its entirety is: "If a party has referred to a document in
any affidavit, and has thereby discovered (legally to the other party) its exis-
tence, and relied upon it, he thereby leaves himself open to have production of it
ordered, unless he can prove special cause to the contrary. The document now
sought was relied on by the defendants on their motion to set aside the judg-
ment, and was referred to in an affidavit filed on their behalf to show that the
lands were not the defendants' lands, but the plaintiff's. In other words, the
defendants wanted the judgment to be set aside, and the plaintiff to be allowed
to go on to a trial in order to find out that the land was his own. Why should
they not now let him see the evidence on which they relied in support of that
contention?" See also the Wile case, note 122, supra, at p. 659; the Schnoll
Fils case, note 123, supra, at p. 233; Burgin v. Ryan, 238 App. Div. 122, 123,
263 N. Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dept. 1933).
125 In the Schmoll Fils case, note 123, supra, at p. 233 it is stated, "Where
a defendant has refused to and thus relied upon documents * * * hip adversary
thereby has a right to a discovery and inspection of these documents." Refer-
ence to a document is thus "reliance", which casts the burden 'upon the party
denying production.
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ance". 126  What is legally included within these terms,
"pleadings or affidavits"? This study discloses the New York
courts holding the actual pleadings, bills of particulars, ex-
aminations before trial, and affidavits on motions, etc., as
"pleadings or affidavits". Any pleading or verified statement
thus comes within the purview of Section 327.127
Can a notice to produce be served immediately after fil-
ing of a pleading, or must issue first be joined? The Corcoran
decisions are in apparent conflict but, as has been pointed
out, 1 27 a the English procedure permits the notice before join-
der of issue. A notice therefore, based solely upon a com-
plaint, counterclaim, or affirmative defense, may be served
before answer or reply.
The notice 128 to produce seemingly carries the penalty
126 Quilter v. Heatly, [1883] 23 Ch. Div. 42, 50, as quoted and adopted in
Wile v. Nassau, note 122, supra, at p. 660. Thus a party is even presumed to
have possession of the documents referred to and it is therefore "not necessary
for the documents to be even in the possession of the adverse party." Schmoll
Fils case, note 123, supra, at p. 233; Hunter v. Dublin, etc., note 124, supra, at
p. 495, "he thereby leaves himself open to have production of it ordered, unless
he can prove special cause to the contrary." "Possession" does not mean actual,
physical possession, but "means sole legal possession, a right and power to deal
with them, Kearsley v. Philipps, 10 Q. B. D. 36, 40; * * * followed in Coomes
v. Hayward, [1913] 1 K. B. 150; the sole property in them, Murray v. Walter,
Cr. & Ph. 114." ANNUAL PRACTICE (1940) 543.
127 The exception noted is the affidavit of documents obtained pursuant to
§ 328. This does not hold true for English practice. The affidavit referred to
in § 327 need not actually be filed in court, it being sufficient if it has been
served and exhibited. Re Fenner and Lord, [1897] 1 Q. B. 667.
127aSupra note 105b. It is submitted that the quoted opinion in the
Corcoran case should be the prevailing one in this respect. However, such
quoted portion is dictum and only the original denial passed squarely upon the
exact situation. This original decision is not an appellate one and should not
be followed. The Appellate Division, in Pearl v. Brutstein, 208 App. Div. 788,
203 N. Y. Supp. 942 (2d Dept. 1924), had before it defendant's appeal from a
denial of its motion to compel production upon plaintiff's failure to comply with
a notice under Section 327. This notice was served before defendant's answer
was interposed and required production of a written agreement annexed to the
complaint and allegedly signed by defendant. The Appellate Court "reversed
on the law" but with "no opinion". The exact question here posed was not
discussed but this case is a basis, if not authority, for the opinion here expressed.
128 Note 32, supra, sets forth the English form of a notice to produce, upon
which the adverse party cross-serves his notice of production at a specific time
and place, pursuant to the rules. The New York form books have been in a
state of confusion and are presently divided as to the place of production, 4
WAIT (3d ed.) 129, requiring production at a blank place on a blank date and
time, "or make other suitable provision for their production"; 2 BENDER, p. 520,
form 2260, requiring production at the office of the attorney giving the notice;
4 CARMODY, p. 2932, and 5 NICHOLS-CAHILL, p. 558, both requiring production at
the office of the producing attorney. The latter forms are more advisable since
it may be "unduly oppressive" to a party to be required-to produce documents
at a place other than his, or his attorney's, office. Because the documents may
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of preclusion, but two questions nevertheless arise. May a
party submit to preclusion instead of production? Or can
an order, carrying another penalty for non-production, issue?
The reasons heretofore given for permitting an English party
to accept preclusion solely,129 are pertinent in New York.
Under Section 324 of the New York Civil Practice Act, the
court is empowered in the first instance to grant discovery
and production which, if refused, subjects him to the effective
punishment of Section 325. He may thus be forced to pay
expenses, meet "such other terms as it (the court) deems
just to impose", have his pleading stricken, or one or more
causes of action, etc. Preclusion may "also" be directed "or
it may punish the party for a contempt; or both." 130 This
latter penalizing section should be limited to the former, else
why incorporate in Section 327 a preclusion statement unless
a limitation is thus placed thereon? Section 325 is verbatim
old Section 808 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure save
that it formerly read, "Where an order, made as prescribed
in the last section, * * *" It is fallacious reasoning to argue
that the Act, incorporating other modes of production, de-
sired these punishments for all and, therefore, omitted the
italicized words. Code Section 808 was also altered by
changing the position of certain words, eliminating commas,
and the elimination of these useless words. Section 327 does
not speak of any order, sets forth merely the notice and the
penalty.for disobeying the notice, and should not be confused
be bulky, or perhaps cannot be conveniently removed for inspection, it is sug-
gested that a variation of the English practice be employed in that, if the docu-
ments cannot be so produced, an opportunity for inspection be given at their
usual repository. The form might well be as follows: "Please take notice that,
pursuant to the provision of § 327 of the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT, the (plaintiff
or defendant) requires you to produce for his inspection, copying or photograph-
ing, the following documents referred to in your (pleading, affidavit, examina-
tion, etc., describing the pleading, etc. carefully) : (List the documents, likewise
describing carefully). Such inspection, etc. is to take place at the office of your
attorney at (address) on (date and time) unless on or before (date) a notice is
served upon me setting such inspection, etc. at ("the usual repository of these
documents", giving place if known and desired) at (either same date and time
or another during business hours, i.e., between 10 and 2 o'clock)." Where the
producing party serves a cross-notice -which is felt to be inconvenient, etc., a
personal approach may be advisable, else cross-notices go on indefinitely, or else
a motion may be made for such date and place by either party. On this motion
the sole question raised would be the date and place and conditions surrounding
the inspection, all else having been admitted by the service of the cross-notice.
129 See notes 52 to 54, mepra.
13 0 N . Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT §§ 325, 405.
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with any other sections. A party is thus enabled to choose
between production or preclusion, which is as it should be.
After service of the notice all questions of production or
preclusion should be referred to the Special Term by mo-
tion. If the notice is too broad, or any privilege is claimed,
the party served therewith should move to vacate or strike
out; if the place or time is objectionable a-motion to modify
is advisable. This follows the procedure outlined in the Wile
case, but an additional step is suggested. The Wile case felt
that unless these motions were made "he risks the exclusion"
of his evidence at the trial because too little time is available
to the trial court for "examination of a collateral issue at
'trial". So, too, it is urged, a motion to preclude should be
part of the procedure involved herein, whether the preclusion
be sought after default on the notice or an order to produce.
The practice under Rule 115(e) of the New York Rules of
Civil Practice, relating to bills of particulars, might well be
assimilated so that "A preclusion order may provide that the
same be effective unless a proper bill is served within (or
production take place at a designated place) a specified time
thereafter." Where preclusion has become effective, a party
should move to open his default upon locating the docu-
ments 131 unless the trial is imminent or actually proceed-
ing, in which event, "In cases in which exceptional circum-
stances are shown, the court may allow this practice (of ob-
taining relief at the trial), but obviously it must be a rare
instance when it ought to be followed." 12
131 Still v. Moss and Burgin v. Ryan, note 97, supra. In the Burgin case it
is said that the preliminary motion "practice in respect to such order of preclu-
sion is unsettled as to whether the application should be made at Special Term
or on the trial. We think the matter rests largely in discretion." After direct-
ing preclusion it gave the party leave to "comply with the notice within three
days and to apply at Trial Term for leave to be allowed to put the same in
evidence upon such terms as may be then imposed." Obviously this decision
evades all issues. If the party complies with the notice why "be allowed" by
the trial court to place it in evidence? Terms should be imposed, if any, at
once, so that the trial court will not be bothered with collateral matters. The
procedure here recommended would eliminate this confusion and, in effect, par-
takes of the English rule that a party, who has given an affidavit of documents
and thereafter discovers others of which inspection should be had, has a duty
to disclose such further documents by either a supplementary affidavit or notice.
Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Co., [1884] 1 Cab. & El. 215, rev'd on other
grounds, 14 Q. B. D. 125; Campbell v. McArthur, [1876], Canada, 7 0. P.
R. 46.
132 Wile v. Nassau Smelting, note 122, supra, at 659.
[ VOL, 14
DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION
A party may take himself without the strictures of Sec-
tion 327 by satisfying the court that he is a defendant and
that the document relates only to his own title. While the
New York courts have not passed upon this exact question,
the English courts seemingly favor the view that any party
to the action should be entitled to this exception. 13 3  While
no English case has been discovered which actually decides
this very question, it is nevertheless suggested that the dis-
tinction is artificial and should not be followed. In any
event the party seeking such protection should be held strictly
to account, the section construed vigorously against these
technicalities, and such unlimited use of documents not be
permitted unless he shall "satisfy" the court of his legal
right thereto.
The court's discretion is likewise invoked with respect to
the "other cause or excuse" deemed "sufficient for not comply-
ing with such notice", but in this field the New York courts
have but tentatively ventured. The English courts have
evolved the rules previously set forth,13 4 and these may sug-
gest additions in this jurisdiction. To date the sole New
York "cause or excuse" deemed sufficient has been complete
destruction or loss of the documents. 135 It appears that the
English Rules have been predicated upon the fact that an
affidavit of documents requires all documents to be listed,
production thereafter being limited to those not privileged,
etc. Thus a party is forced to list his documents but may
claim privilege later.136 These privileges are necessarily
133 See notes 42, 43, supra.
134 See notes 44 to 51, sipra.
135 Liggett v. Comprodaily Pub. Co., 256 App. Div. 1005 (2d Dept. 1939);
Still v. Moss, note 97, supra. In the case of Kiss v. Kiss, note 83, srupra, no
reason is given for the denial of production although such denial is clearly
predicated upon "some other cause or excuse" deemed sufficient. The court's
discretion, it should be noted, had been exercised in the previous appeal under§ 324, so that the claim of "right" under § 327 fell on deaf ears.
'3 This brings up again the segregation of procedure under §§ 324 and 328
on the one hand, and § 327 on the other. Under the former procedure the
application under § 324 is "hedged about with legislative restrictions, imposed
through the fear that otherwise the rights of the party against whom the dis-
covery and inspection was sought might be unduly prejudiced." Schinoll Fils
case, note 123, supra, at 232. The discovery is regulated by Rules 140-142 of
the RULES OF CIv. PRAc. is entirely discretionary, although, for example, the
documents must be admissible on the trial as evidence and must be material to
the issues. Falco v. N. Y., etc., 161 App. Div. 735, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1024 (2d
Dept. 1914); Murphy v. Keenan, 101 Misc. 443, 167 N. Y. Supp. 55 (1917),
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broader and more numerous than where a party voluntarily
waives whatever privilege he may have by referring to and
relying upon a document. The legal professional privilege
can undoubtedly be waived at the trial; so too with those
documents of an incriminating or penalizing nature, or which
are held as an agent, or which relate exclusively to one's case,
or which may be unduly oppressive to produce. Where the
state interposes an objection, the picture may be somewhat
changed, but in this situation the court's discretion is in-
voked. It would thus appear that the only English objec-
tion as yet valid in New York is that referring to the "sole
legal possession", and this is qualified to the "physical" pos-
session. 'The English privileges are not of great moment
.here, and the New York privileges appear few- and far be-
tween, only destruction or loss being thus far acceptable.
Where any excuse is acceptable to the court terms may be
imposed "as the court shall think fit." 137
It is trusted that this analysis may be made the basis
for the future construction placed upon, and practice pro-
cedure followed with respect to, Section 327. Since this
article is but the writer's tentative formulation of the decided
New York cases, the English practice has been set forth in
contrasting detail so that abundant references are immedi-
ately available. This weapon, it is felt, should not rust in
our legal armory.
MoRiis D. FORKOSCH.
aff'd without opinion, 183 App. Div. 923, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1099 (1st Dept.
1918); Bencoe v. McDonnell, 210 App. Div. 123, 205 N. Y. Supp. 343 (2d
Dept. 1924). In the Murphy case, at p. 446, it is stated "The application,
however, in any case will be granted only in the exercise of a sound discretion
in the ascertainment of truth and the advancement of justice but it must appear
that the evidence is competent, relevant, and material to the issues, unknown to
the party seeking it and in the possession of the adverse party."
137 Where the exception of "title" is approved by the court (as to defen-
dant's or plaintiff's title or case, see notes 42 and 43, mtpra) it is submitted
that no costs or terms can be imposed and the document should be introduced
as a matter of right. The peculiar manner in which § 327 has been punctuated,
having a semi-colon before "in which case", differs from the English Rule 15,
which has merely a comma. It is felt that the last portion of § 327 refers only
to the "cause or excuse" clause preceding it, and that the disjunctive separation
of exceptions is intended to apply terms only to the latter, not the former.
